High-bandwidth Digital Content Protection System

Interface Independent Adaptation

<u>9 May, 2011</u>

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1 Introduction

1.1 Scope

This specification describes an interface independent adaptation of the High-bandwidth Digital Content Protection (HDCP) system, Revision $2\underline{10}$. This specification can be applied over any wired or wireless interface as explained in subsequent chapters.

For the purpose of this specification, it is assumed that the Audiovisual content is transmitted over any wired or wireless display link. For example, this specification can be applied for the protection of Audiovisual content over an IP based wireless interface.

In an HDCP System, two or more HDCP Devices are interconnected through an HDCP-protected Interface. The Audiovisual Content flows from the Upstream Content Control Function into the HDCP System at the most upstream HDCP Transmitter. From there the Audiovisual Content encrypted by the HDCP System, referred to as HDCP Content, flows through a tree-shaped topology of HDCP Receivers over HDCP-protected Interfaces. This specification describes a content protection mechanism for: (1) authentication of HDCP Receivers to their immediate upstream connection (i.e., an HDCP Transmitter), (2) revocation of HDCP Receivers that are determined by the Digital Content Protection, LLC, to be invalid, and (3) HDCP Encryption of Audiovisual Content over the HDCP-protected Interfaces between HDCP Transmitters and their downstream HDCP Receivers. HDCP Receivers may be HDCP Repeaters that serve as downstream HDCP Transmitters emitting the HDCP Content further downstream to one or more additional HDCP Receivers.

Unless otherwise specified, the term "HDCP Receiver" is also used to refer to the upstream HDCP-protected interface port of an HDCP Repeater. Similarly, the term "HDCP Transmitter" is also used to refer to the downstream HDCP-protected interface port of an HDCP Repeater

Except when specified otherwise, HDCP 2.1-compliant Devices must interoperate with other HDCP 2.1-compliant Devices and HDCP 2.0-compliant Devices connected to their HDCP-protected Interface Ports using the same protocol. HDCP Transmitters must support HDCP Repeaters.

The state machines in this specification define the required behavior of HDCP Devices. The linkvisible behavior of HDCP Devices implementing the specified state machines must be identical, even if implementations differ from the descriptions. The behavior of HDCP Devices implementing the specified state machines must also be identical from the perspective of an entity outside of the HDCP System.

Implementations must include all elements of the content protection system described herein, unless the element is specifically identified as informative or optional. Adopters must also ensure that implementations satisfy the robustness and compliance rules described in the technology license.

Device discovery and association, and link setup and teardown, is outside the scope of this specification.

1.2 Definitions

The following terminology, as used throughout this specification, is defined as herein:

Audiovisual Content. Audiovisual works (as defined in the United States Copyright Act as in effect on January 1, 1978), text and graphic images, are referred to as *AudioVisual Content*.

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Authorized Device. An HDCP Device that is permitted access to HDCP Content is referred to as an *Authorized Device*. An HDCP Transmitter may test if a connected HDCP Receiver is an Authorized Device by successfully completing the following stages of the authentication protocol – Authentication and Key Exchange (AKE) and Locality check. If the authentication protocol successfully results in establishing authentication, then the other device is considered by the HDCP Transmitter to be an Authorized Device.

Content Stream, *Content Stream* consists of Audiovisual Content received from an Upstream Content Control Function that is to be encrypted and Audiovisual Content received from an Upstream Content Control Function that is encrypted by the HDCP System.

Device Key Set. An HDCP Receiver has a Device Key Set, which consists of its corresponding Device Secret Keys along with the associated Public Key Certificate.

Device Secret Keys. For an HDCP Transmitter, Device Secret Key consists of the secret <u>Global</u> <u>Constant</u>. For an HDCP Receiver, Device Secret Keys consists of the secret <u>Global</u> <u>Constant</u> and the RSA private key. The Device Secret Keys are to be protected from exposure outside of the HDCP Device.

downstream. The term, *downstream*, is used as an adjective to refer to being towards the sink of the HDCP Content. For example, when an HDCP Transmitter and an HDCP Receiver are connected over an HDCP-protected Interface, the HDCP Receiver can be referred to as the *downstream* HDCP Device in this connection. For another example, on an HDCP Repeater, the HDCP-protected Interface Port(s) which can emit HDCP Content can be referred to as its *downstream* HDCP-protected Interface Port(s). See also, *upstream*.

Global Constant. A 128-bit random, secret constant provided only to HDCP adopters and used during HDCP Content encryption or decryption

HDCP 1.x. *HDCP 1.x* refers to, specifically, the variant of HDCP described by Revision 1.00 (referred to as HDCP 1.0), Revision 1.10 (referred to as HDCP 1.1), Revision 1.20 (referred to as HDCP 1.2) and Revision 1.30 (referred to as HDCP 1.3) along with their associated errata, if applicable.

HDCP 1.x-compliant Device. An HDCP Device that is designed in adherence to HDCP 1.x, defined above, is referred to as an *HDCP 1.x-compliant Device*.

HDCP 2. *HDCP 2* refers to, specifically, the variant of HDCP mapping for all HDCP protected interfaces described by Revision 2.00 and higher versions along with their associated errata, if applicable.

HDCP 2.0. *HDCP 2.0* refers to, specifically, the variant of HDCP mapping described by Revision 2.00 of this specification along with its associated errata, if applicable.

HDCP 2.0-compliant Device. An HDCP Device that is designed in adherence to HDCP 2.0 is referred to as an *HDCP 2.0-compliant Device*.

HDCP 2.1. *HDCP 2.1* refers to, specifically, the variant of HDCP mapping described by Revision 2.10 of this specification along with its associated errata, if applicable.

HDCP 2.1-compliant Device. An HDCP Device that is designed in adherence to HDCP 2.1 is referred to as an HDCP 2.1-compliant Device.

HDCP Content. *HDCP Content* consists of Audiovisual Content that is protected by the HDCP System. *HDCP Content* includes the Audiovisual Content in encrypted form as it is transferred

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from an HDCP Transmitter to an HDCP Receiver over an HDCP-protected Interface, as well as any translations of the same content, or portions thereof. For avoidance of doubt, Audiovisual Content that is never encrypted by the HDCP System is not *HDCP Content*.

HDCP Device. Any device that contains one or more HDCP-protected Interface Port and is designed in adherence to HDCP is referred to as an *HDCP Device*.

HDCP Encryption. *HDCP Encryption* is the encryption technology of HDCP when applied to the protection of HDCP Content in an HDCP System.

HDCP Receiver. An HDCP Device that can receive and decrypt HDCP Content through one or more of its HDCP-protected Interface Ports is referred to as an *HDCP Receiver*.

HDCP Repeater. An HDCP Device that can receive and decrypt HDCP Content through one or more of its HDCP-protected Interface Ports, and can also re-encrypt and emit said HDCP Content through one or more of its HDCP-protected Interface Ports, is referred to as an *HDCP Repeater*. An *HDCP Repeater* may also be referred to as either an HDCP Receiver or an HDCP Transmitter when referring to either the upstream side or the downstream side, respectively.

HDCP Session. An *HDCP* Session is established between an HDCP Transmitter and HDCP Receiver with the transmission or reception of $r_{r_{1}}$ as part of the authentication initiation message, AKE_Init. The established HDCP Session remains valid until it is aborted by the HDCP Transmitter or a new HDCP Session is established, which invalidates the HDCP Session that was previously established, by the transmission or reception of a new $r_{r_{1}}$ as part of the AKE Init message.

HDCP System. An *HDCP System* consists of an HDCP Transmitter, zero or more HDCP Repeaters and one or more HDCP Receivers connected through their HDCP-protected interfaces in a tree topology; whereas the said HDCP Transmitter is the HDCP Device most upstream, and receives the Audiovisual Content from one or more Upstream Content Control Functions. All HDCP Devices connected to other HDCP Devices in an *HDCP System* over HDCP-protected Interfaces are part of the *HDCP System*.

HDCP Transmitter. An HDCP Device that can encrypt and emit HDCP Content through one or more of its HDCP-protected Interface Ports is referred to as an *HDCP Transmitter*.

HDCP. *HDCP* is an acronym for High-bandwidth Digital Content Protection. This term refers to this content protection system as described by any revision of this specification and its errata.

HDCP-protected Interface Port. A logical connection point on an HDCP Device that supports an HDCP-protected Interface is referred to as an *HDCP-protected Interface Port.* A single connection can be made over an HDCP-protected interface port.

HDCP-protected Interface. An interface for which HDCP applies is described as an *HDCP-protected Interface*.

Master Key. A 128-bit random, secret cryptographic key negotiated between the HDCP Transmitter and the HDCP Receiver during Authentication and Key Exchange and used to pair the HDCP Transmitter with the HDCP Receiver.


Public Key Certificate. Each HDCP Receiver is issued a Public Key Certificate signed by DCP LLC, and contains the Receiver ID and RSA public key corresponding to the HDCP Receiver.

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Receiver Connected Indication . An indication to the HD has been connected to it. The format of the indication Transmitter to connect to or disconnect from a receiver is our	or the method used by the HDCP		
Receiver Disconnected Indication . An indication to the H been disconnected from it. The format of the indication Transmitter to connect to or disconnect from a receiver is our	or the method used by the HDCP		
Receiver ID . A 40-bit value that uniquely identifies the HD an HDCP $1.x$ KSV i.e. it contains 20 ones and 20 zeroes.	CP Receiver. It has the same format as		
Session Key. <u>A 128-bit random, secret cryptographic</u> Transmitter and the HDCP Receiver during Session Ke Content encryption or decryption.	key negotiated between the HDCP y exchange and used during HDCP	(Formatted: Font: Not Bold
Upstream Content Control Function . The HDCP Tran System receives Audiovisual Content to be protected f <i>Function</i> . The <i>Upstream Content Control Function</i> is not methods used, if any, by the <i>Upstream Content Control Fun-</i> System is correctly authenticated or permitted to receive the Audiovisual Content to the HDCP System, are beyond th personal computer platform, an example of an <i>Upstream</i> software designed to emit Audiovisual Content to a disp requires HDCP.	rom the Upstream Content Control t part of the HDCP System, and the ction to determine for itself the HDCP Audiovisual Content, or to transfer the he scope of this specification. On a <i>n</i> Content Control Function may be		Deleted: An instance of the <i>Upstream Content</i> <i>Control Function</i> transmits a content stream to the HDCP Transmitter.
upstream . The term, <i>upstream</i> , is used as an adjective to re HDCP Content. For example, when an HDCP Transmitter over an HDCP-protected Interface, the HDCP Transmitte HDCP Device in this connection. For another example, protected Interface Port(s) which can receive HDCP Conte HDCP-protected Interface Port(s). See also, <i>downstream</i> .	and an HDCP Receiver are connected r can be referred to as the <i>upstream</i> on an HDCP Repeater, the HDCP-	(Deleted: stream
1.3 Overview 1. HDCP is designed to protect the transmission of Au Transmitter and an HDCP Receiver. The HDCP Th connections to HDCP Receivers through one or more The system also allows for HDCP Repeaters that s Interface Ports. The HDCP Devices, including HDCP Repeaters protected Interface port.	ransmitter may support simultaneous of its HDCP-protected interface ports. support downstream HDCP-protected wels of HDCP Repeaters and as many		Formatted: Bullets and Numbering Deleted: places the following constraints on the
Figure 1.1 illustrates an example connection topology for HI	DCP Devices.		number of HDCP Devices and levels of HDCP Repeaters in the topology.¶ <#>Up to four levels of HDCP Repeaters and as many as 32 total HDCP Devices, including HDCP Repeaters, are allowed to be connected to an HDCP- protected Interface port; and¶ An instance of an Upstream Content Control Function transmits a content stream to the HDCP Transmitter. For every such content stream received and encrypted by the HDCP System, the HDCP Transmitter is allowed to transmit the generated HDCP Content stream to up to four levels of HDCP Repeaters and as many as 32 total HDCP Devices, including HDCP Repeaters.



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


Figure 1.1. Sample Connection Topology of an HDCP System

There are three elements of the content protection system. Each element plays a specific role in the system. First, there is the authentication protocol, through which the HDCP Transmitter verifies that a given HDCP Receiver is licensed to receive HDCP Content. The authentication protocol is implemented between the HDCP Transmitter and its corresponding downstream HDCP Receiver. With the legitimacy of the HDCP Receiver determined, encrypted HDCP Content is transmitted between the two devices based on shared secrets established during the authentication protocol. This prevents eavesdropping devices from utilizing the content. Finally, in the event that legitimate devices are compromised to permit unauthorized use of HDCP Content, renewability allows an HDCP Transmitter to identify such compromised devices and prevent the transmission of HDCP Content.

This document contains chapters describing in detail the requirements of each of these elements. In addition, a chapter is devoted to describing the cipher structure that is used in the encryption of HDCP Content.

1.4 Terminology

Throughout this specification, names that appear in italic refer to values that are exchanged during the HDCP cryptographic protocol. C-style notation is used throughout the state diagrams and protocol diagrams, although the logic functions AND, OR, and XOR are written out where a textual description would be more clear.

This specification uses the big-endian notation to represent bit strings so that the most significant bit in the representation is stored in the left-most bit position. The concatenation operator '||' combines two values into one. For eight-bit values a and b, the result of $(a \parallel b)$ is a 16-bit value, with the value *a* in the most significant eight bits and *b* in the least significant eight bits.

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2 Authentication Protocol

2.1 Overview

The HDCP authentication protocol is an exchange between an HDCP Transmitter and an HDCP Receiver that affirms to the HDCP Transmitter that the HDCP Receiver is authorized to receive HDCP Content. It is comprised of the following stages

- Authentication and Key Exchange (AKE) The HDCP Receiver's public key certificate is verified by the HDCP Transmitter. A Master Key km is exchanged.
- Locality Check The HDCP Transmitter enforces locality on the content by requiring that the Round Trip Time (RTT) between a pair of messages is not more than 7 ms.
- Session Key Exchange (SKE) The HDCP Transmitter exchanges <u>Session Key k_s with</u> the HDCP Receiver.
- Authentication with Repeaters The step is performed by the HDCP Transmitter only with HDCP Repeaters. In this step, the repeater assembles downstream topology information and forwards it to the upstream HDCP Transmitter.

Successful completion of AKE and locality check stages affirms to the HDCP Transmitter that the HDCP Receiver is authorized to receive HDCP Content. At the end of the authentication protocol, a communication path is established between the HDCP Transmitter and HDCP Receiver that only Authorized Devices can access.

All HDCP Devices contain a 128-bit secret <u>Global</u> <u>Constant denoted by lc_{128} . All HDCP Devices</u> share the same <u>Global</u> <u>Constant</u>. lc_{128} is provided only to HDCP adopters.

The HDCP Transmitter contains the 3072-bit RSA public key of DCP LLC denoted by kpubdep.

The HDCP Receiver is issued 1024-bit RSA public and private keys. The public key is stored in a Public Key Certificate issued by DCP LLC, denoted by $cert_{rx}$. Table 2.1 gives the fields contained in the certificate. All values are stored in big-endian format.

Name	Size (bits)	Bit position	Function
Receiver ID	40	4175:4136	Unique receiver identifier. It has the same format as an HDCP 1.x KSV i.e. it contains 20 ones and 20 zeroes
Receiver Public Key	1048	4135:3088	Unique RSA public key of HDCP Receiver denoted by $kpub_{rx}$. The first 1024 bits is the big-endian representation of the modulus n and the trailing 24 bits is the big-endian representation of the public exponent e
Reserved	16	3087:3072	Reserved for future definition. Must be 0x0000
DCP LLC Signature	3072	3071:0	A cryptographic signature calculated over all preceding fields of the certificate. RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 is the signature scheme used as defined by PKCS #1 V2.1: RSA Cryptography Standard. SHA-256 is the underlying hash function

Table 2.1. Public Key Certificate of HDCP Receiver

The secret RSA private key is denoted by $kpriv_{rx}$. The computation time of RSA private key operation can be reduced by using the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) technique. Therefore, it is recommended that HDCP Receivers use the CRT technique for private key computations.


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
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2.2 Authentication and Key Exchange

Authentication and Key Exchange (AKE) is the first step in the authentication protocol. Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 illustrates the AKE. The HDCP Transmitter (*Device A*) can initiate authentication at any time, even before a previous authentication exchange has completed. The HDCP Transmitter initiates a new HDCP Session by sending a new r_{tx} as part of the authentication initiation message, AKE_Init. Message formats are defined in Section 4.2.





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 evision 2.1. Digital Content Protection LLC Deleted: 0 scheme must be used as defined by PKCS #1 V2.1: RSA Cryptography Standard. SHA-256 is the underlying hash function. The mask generation function used is MGFI which uses SHA-256 as its underlying hash function. Verifies integrity of the System Renewability Message (SRM). It does this by checking the signature of the Similar state state state of the Similar state state state of the Similar state of the Similar state state stat	
 Cryptography Standard. SIA-256 is the underlying hash function. The mask generation function used is MGF1 which uses SIA-256 as its underlying hash function. Verifies integrity of the System Resevability Message (SRM). It does this by checking the signature of the SRM using Publam Failure of this integrity check constitues an authentication failure and causes the HDCP Transmitter to abort authentication protocol. The top-level HDCP Transmitter to abort authentication protocol is aborted. SRM integrity check and revocation check are performed only by the top-level HDCP Transmitter. Receives AKE_Send, rrx message from the receiver containing the 64-bit pseudo-random value (r_{co}). Performs key derivation as explained in Section 2.7 to generate 256-bit kt_b, k_c = dex_b_a (Mac), McKer No. 10 to the receiver containing the 256-bit H = HMAC-SHA256(r_a XOR REPEATER and the key used for HMAC is k_a REPEATER is XORed with the least significant Hype of r_a. Receives AKE_Send, H_prime message from the receiver containing the 256-bit H. This message must be received within one second after sending r_{bac}/dmi (McK. PL. No. Stored, J. No) to the receiver. Authentication fails and the authentication protocol is aborted if the message is not received within one second after sending r_{bac}/dmi (McK. PL. No. Stored, J. No) to the receiver. Authentication fails and the authentication protocol is aborted if the message is not received within one second after between H and H[*]. Sends AKE_Stored Am message to the receiver with the 128-bit <i>Eq.(k_a)</i> and the 128-bit <i>m</i> corresponding to the <i>Receiver ID</i> of the HDCP Transmitter has a 128-bit <i>m</i> corresponding to the <i>Receiver ID</i> of the HDCP Transmitter has the authentication protocol. Werifies integrity of the System Renewability Message (SRM). It does this by checking the signature of the sRM using kpuka_b. Failure of this integrity check constitues an authentication failow. Werifies integri	
 this by checking the signature of the SRM using kpubag. Failure of this integrity check constitutes an authentication failure and causes the HDCP Transmitter to abort authentication protocol. The top-level HDCP Transmitter checks to see if the <i>Receiver ID</i> of the connected HDCP Device is found in the revocation list, authentication failures). Deleted: (See Section 2.7 on handling integrity check and revocation check are performed only by the top-level HDCP Transmitter. Receives AKE, Send, Trx message from the receiver containing the 64-bit pseudo-random value (r_n). Performs key derivation as explained in Section 2.7 to generate 256-bit k_n k_k = dkey₀ dkey₁, where dkey₀ and dkey₁ are derived keys generated When ctr = 0 and ctr = 1 respectively. dkey₁ and dkey₁ are in big-endian order. Computes 256-bit H = HMAC-SHA256(r_n, XOR REPEATER, k_k) where HMAC-SHA256 is computed over r_n XOR REPEATER, k_k where HMAC-SHA256 is computed over r_n. XOR REPEATER, k_k where there is not received within one second after sending <i>E_{kya}dkm</i>) (AKE_No_Stored_km) to the receiver. Authentication failures) If the HDCP Transmitter has a 128-bit Master Key k_n stored corresponding to the <i>Receiver ID</i> of the HDCP Transmitter authentication protocol is aborted if the HDCP Transmitter back constitutes an authentication protocol is descenter <i>ID</i> of the HDCP Transmitter of the System Renewability Message (SRM). It does this by checking the signature of the SRM using kpub_{Ap}. Failure of this integrity of the System Renewability Message (SRM). It does this by checking the signature of the SRM using kpub_{Ap}. Failure of this integrity check constitutes an authentication protocol. 	
 The top-level HDCP Transmitter checks to see if the <i>Receiver ID</i> of the connected device is found in the revocation list, authentication fails and the authentication protocol is aborted [SKM] integrity check and revocation check are performed only by the top-level HDCP Transmitter. Receives AKE_Send_rrx message from the receiver containing the 64-bit pseudo-random value (r_a). Performs key derivation as explained in Section 2.7 to generate 256-bit k_k, k_k = dkey₀ (key), where dkey₀ and dkey₁ are derived keys generated when ctr = 0 and ctr = 1 respectively. dkey₀ and dkey₁ are in big-endian order. Computes 256-bit H = HMAC-SHA256(r_x XOR REPEATER k₀) where HMAC-SHA256 is computed over r_x. XOR REPEATER and the key used for HMAC is k_k, REPEATER is XORed with the least significant byte of r_x. Receives AKE_Send_L prime message from the receiver containing the 256-bit H = 1MAC-SHA256 (r_x XOR REPEATER and the key used for HMAC is k_k, REPEATER is XORed with the least significant byte of r_x. Receives AKE_Send_L prime message from the receiver containing the 256-bit H = 1MAC-SHA256 (r_x NOR repEATER is a mismatch between H and H[*]_x. Sends AKE_Stored_km message to the receiver with the 128-bit <i>E₁₀(k_m)</i> and the 128-bit <i>m</i> corresponding to the <i>Receiver ID</i> of the HDCP Transmitter has a 128-bit <i>m</i> corresponding to the <i>Receiver ID</i> of this integrity of the System Renewability Message (SRM). It does this by checking the signature of the SRM using kpub_{k-x}. Failure of this integrity of the CX start of the SRM using kpub_{k-x}. Failure of this integrity of the Zystem Renewability Message (SRM). It does this by checking the signature of the SRM using kpub_{k-x}. Failure of this integrity of the Zystem Renewability Message (SRM). It does this by checking the signature of the SRM using kpub_{k-x}. Failure of this integrity of the Zystem Renewability Message to the receiver <i>ID</i> of the HDCP Transmitter to abort the authentication	
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 this by checking the signature of the SRM using kpub_{dcp}. Failure of this integrity check constitutes an authentication failure and causes the HDCP Transmitter to abort the authentication protocol. The top-level HDCP Transmitter checks to see if the <i>Receiver ID</i> of 	
•	
of the connected HDCP Device is found in the revocation list, authentication fails and the authentication protocol is aborted.	
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vision 2. <mark>1</mark>	maoponaoneria	daptation Specification	May 9, 2011	 Deleted: Oct 23, 2008
			Digital Content Protection LLC	 Deleted: 0
		Receives AKE_Send_rrx mes 64-bit pseudo-random value (<i>r</i>	sage from the receiver containing the x_{x} from the receiver.	
	•	bit k_d . $k_d = dkey_0 \parallel dkey_1$, w	plained in Section 2.7 to generate 256- here $dkey_0$ and $dkey_1$ are derived keys = 1 respectively. $dkey_0$ and $dkey_1$ are in	
		where HMAC-SHA256 is con	C-SHA256(r_{tx} XOR REPEATER, k_d) mputed over r_{tx} XOR REPEATER and . REPEATER is XORed with the least	
		the 256-bit <i>H</i> '. This message sending the AKE_Stored_km fails and the authentication pr	e message from the receiver containing must be received within 200 ms after message to the receiver. Authentication otocol is aborted if the message is not e is a mismatch between H and $H'_{}$	 Deleted: (See Section 2.7 on handling
The H	DCP Receiver			authentication failures)
11011				
•	Sends AKE_Ser	nd_Cert message in response to A	KE_Init	
	If AKE Transn	utter Info message is received	sends AKE Receiver Info message to	 Formattade Bullats and Numbering
<u>-</u>		fter sending the AKE Send Cert		Formatted: Bullets and Numbering
		•	•	
•			E_Send_rrx message immediately after ored_km message from the transmitter.	 Deleted: <i>r_{rr}</i> must be generated only after either AKE_No_Stored_km or AKE_Stored_km messa
	o If AKE	E_No_Stored_km is received, the	HDCP Receiver	is received from the transmitter.
	•	Decrypts k_m with kpriv _{rx} using	RSAES-OAEP decryption scheme.	
	•	bit k_d . $k_d = dkey_0 \parallel dkey_1$, w	plained in Section 2.7 to generate 256- here $dkey_0$ and $dkey_1$ are derived keys = 1 respectively. $dkey_0$ and $dkey_1$ are in	
	•	AKE_Send_H_prime message	$256(r_{tx} \text{ XOR REPEATER, } k_d)$. Sends immediately after computation of <i>H</i> ' to ecceived by the transmitter within the t the transmitter.	
	o If AK	E_Stored_km is received, the HD	CP Receiver	
	•	Computes 128-bit $k_h = SHA-2$:	56(kpriv _{rx})[127:0]	
	•	Decrypts $E_{kh}(k_m)$ using AES we in to the AES module as illustr	ith the received <i>m</i> as input and k_h as key ated in Figure 2.3 to derive k_m .	
	•	bit k_d . $k_d = dkey_0 \parallel dkey_1$, w	plained in Section 2.7 to generate 256- here $dkey_0$ and $dkey_1$ are derived keys = 1 respectively. $dkey_0$ and $dkey_1$ are in	
		big-endian order.		

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 Computes H' = HMAC-SHA256(r_{tx} XOR REPEATER, k_d). Sends AKE_Send_H_prime message immediately after computation of H' to ensure that the message is received by the transmitter within the specified 200 ms timeout at the transmitter.

On a decryption failure of k_m with kpriv_{rx}, the HDCP Receiver does not send H' and simply lets the timeout occur on the HDCP Transmitter.

If the HDCP Receiver does not receive AKE Transmitter Info message before the reception of AKE No Stored km or AKE Stored km message, it indicates that the HDCP Transmitter is an HDCP 2.0-compliant Device.

If the HDCP Transmitter does not receive AKE Receiver Info message within 100 ms of the transmission of AKE Transmitter Info message, it indicates that the HDCP Receiver is an HDCP 2.0-compliant Device.

2.2.1 Pairing

To speed up the AKE process, pairing must be implemented between the HDCP Transmitter and HDCP Receiver in parallel with AKE. When AKE_No_Stored_km message is received from the transmitter, it is an indication to the receiver that the transmitter does not have k_m stored corresponding to the receiver. In this case, after computing H', the HDCP Receiver

- Computes 128-bit $k_h = SHA-256(kpriv_{rx})[127:0]$.
- Generates 128-bit $E_{kh}(k_m)$ by encrypting k_m with k_h using AES as illustrated in Figure 2.3.
- Sends AKE_Send_Pairing_Info to the transmitter containing the 128-bit $E_{kh}(k_m)$.

On receiving AKE_Send_Pairing_Info message, the HDCP Transmitter <u>may persistently store m</u> (which is r_n appended with 64 0s), k_m and $E_{kh}(k_m)$ along with Receiver ID

Jf AKE_Send_Pairing_Info is not received by the HDCP Transmitter within 200 ms of the reception of AKE_Send_H_prime, authentication fails and the authentication protocol is aborted.

Note: The HDCP Transmitter may store in its non-volatile storage m, k_m and $E_{kb}(k_m)$ along with corresponding *Receiver IDs* of all HDCP Receivers with which pairing was implemented by the HDCP Transmitter.

Figure 2.3 illustrates the encryption of k_m with k_h.

Deleted: <#>Persistently stores *m* (which is r_{tx} appended with 64 0s), k_m and $E_{kh}(k_m)$ along with *Receiver ID*. k_m and $E_{kh}(k_m)$ must be stored securely.¶

Deleted: (See Section 2.7 on handling authentication failures)

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


Figure 2.3. $E_{kh}(k_m)$ Computation

128-bit *m* is constructed by appending 64 0s to r_{tx} . r_{tx} is in big-endian order.

2.3 Locality Check

Locality check is performed after AKE and pairing. The HDCP Transmitter initiates locality check by sending a 64-bit pseudo-random nonce r_n to the downstream receiver.

If the HDCP Receiver is HDCP 2.0-compliant or if the RECEIVER LOCALITY PRECOMPUTE SUPPORT bit received as part of the AKE Receiver Info message is set to zero or the TRANSMITTER_LOCALITY_PRECOMPUTE_SUPPORT bit to zero in its AKE_Transmitter_Info message.gethe HDCP Transmitter
• Initiates locality check by sending LC_Init message containing a 64-bit pseudo-random nonce r_n to the HDCP Receiver.
Sets its watchdog timer to 7 ms. Locality check fails if the watchdog timer expires before LC_Send_L_prime message is received.
• Computes L = HMAC-SHA256(r_n , k_d XOR r_{rx}) where HMAC-SHA256 is computed over r_n and the key used for HMAC is k_d XOR r_{rx} , where r_{rx} is XORed with the least-significant 64-bits of k_d .
On receiving LC_Send_L_prime message, compares L and L'. Locality check fails if L is not equal to L' Formatted: Subscript
If the RECEIVER LOCALITY PRECOMPUTE SUPPORT bit received as part of the Arrow AKE Receiver Info message is set to one and the transmitter has set the TRANSMITTER LOCALITY PRECOMPUTE SUPPORT bit to one in its AKE Transmitter Info message, the HDCP Transmitter
 Initiates locality check by sending LC Init message containing a 64-bit pseudo-random⁴ Formatted: Bullets and Numbering nonce r_n to the HDCP Receiver.


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Computer 256-bit L = HMAC/SHA256r _x , k _y XOR r _x) where HMAC/SHA256 is computed over r _x and the key used for HMAC is k _y XOR r _x , where r _x is XORed with the least-significant 64-bits of k _y . On receiving the RTT Ready message from the receiver, the transmitter sends an RTT-Challenge message containing the least significant 28-bits of L. Sets its watchdog timer to 7 ms, Locality check fails if the watchdog timer expires before LC. Send L prime message message is the HDCP Transmitter compares the received value with the most significant 128-bits of L and locality check fails if there is a minimuch. An HDCP Repeater initiates locality check on all its downstream HDCP-protected interface ports by sending unique r _x values to the connected HDCP Devices. Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5 illustrate, locality check between the HDCP Transmitter and HDCP. Deleted: s Figure 2.4 mod Figure 2.6 illustrate, locality check between the HDCP Transmitter and HDCP. Figure 2.4 Locality Check between the HDCP Transmitter and HDCP. Figure 2.4 Locality Check between the HDCP Transmitter and HDCP. Figure 2.4 Locality Check between HDCP Transmitter and HDCP. Figure 2.4 Locality Check between HDCP Transmitter and HDCP. Figure 2.4 Locality Check between HDCP Transmitter and HDCP. Figure 2.4 Locality Check between HDCP Transmitter and HDCP. Figure 2.4 Locality Check between HDCP Transmitter and HDCP. Figure 2.4 Locality Check between HDCP Transmitter and HDCP. Figure 2.4 Locality Check between HDCP Transmitter and HDCP. Figure 2.4 Locality Check between HDCP Transmitter and HDCP. Figure 2.4 Locality Check between HDCP Transmitter and HDCP. Figure 2.4 Locality Check between HDCP Transmitter and HDCP. Figure 2.4 Locality Check between LC LTD. Figure 2.4 Locality Check between LC LTD. Figure 2.4 Locality Check LC Linit Set and HDCP. Figure 2.4 Locality Check LC Linit Set and LTD.	erface Independent Adaptation Specificatio			- Deleted: Oct 23, 2008
<pre>computed over, and the key used for HMAC is k_kXOR r_{in}, where r_n is XORed with the hast-significant 64-bits of k_n.</pre> On receiving the RTT Ready message from the receiver, the transmitter sends an RTT Challence message containing the least significant 128-bits of L. Set its watchdog timer to 7 ms. Locality check fails if the watchdog timer expires before LC. Send L_prime message is received. On receiving 1.C. Send L_prime message is received. On receiving 1.C. Send L_prime message is received. On receiving 1.C. Send L_prime message is received. Formatted: Subscript On receiving 1.C. Send L_prime message is received. An HDCP Repeater initiates locality check on all its downstream HDCP-protected interface ports by sending unique r, values to the connected HDCP Devices. Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5 illustrate locality check between the HDCP Transmitter and HDCP. Fuer 2.4. Locality Check between HDCP Transmitter and HDCP Fuer e 2.4. Locality Check between HDCP Transmitter and HDCP HDCP Transmiter (Device A) HDCP Transmitter (Device B) HDCP Transmitter (Device A) HDCP Receiver (Device B) HDCP Transmitter (Devi	2. <u>1</u>	Digital Content	Protection LLC	Deleted: 0
RTT_Challenge message containing the least significant 128-bits of L. •	<u>computed over r_n and the key used for HM</u>			
Sets its watchdog timer to 7 ms. Locality check fails if the watchdog timer expires before LC_Send L_prime message message is received. Formatted: Subscript Formatted: Subscript Formatted: Subscript Formatted: Subscript An HDCP Repeater initiates locality check on all its downstream HDCP-protected interface ports by sending unique r, values to the connected HDCP Devices. Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5 illustrate locality check between the HDCP Transmitter and HDCP. Deteted: s Compute L=HMACSHA256(r, k, NOR r,) Figure 2.4. Locality Check between HDCP Transmitter and HDCP Formatted: Subscript MDCP Transmitter (Device A) HDCP Transmitter (Device B) HDCP Transmitter (Device A) HDCP Transmitter (Device A) HDCP Transmitter (Device B) Figure 2.4. Locality Check between HDCP Transmitter and HDCP Formatted: Subscript Compute L=HMACSHA256(r, k, NOR r,) Figure 2.4. Locality Check between HDCP Transmitter and HDCP Formatted: Subscript Figure 2.4. Locality Check between HDCP Transmitter and HDCP Formatted: Subscript Figure 2.4. Locality Check between HDCP Transmitter and HDCP Kereiver HDCP Transmitter (Device A) HDCP Transmitter (Device B) HDCP Transmitter (Device A) HDCP Transmitter (Device B) HDCP Transmitter (Device A) HDCP Transmitter (Device B) HDCP Transmi			mitter sends an	
LC Send L prime message is received Formatted: Subscript On receiving LC Send L prime message, the HDCP Transmitter compares the received value with the most significant 128-bits of L and locality check fails if there is a mismatch Image: Compare index of the most significant 128-bits of L and locality check fails if there is a mismatch An HDCP Repeater initiates locality check on all its downstream HDCP-protected interface ports by sending unique r, values to the connected HDCP Devices. Deleted: s Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5 illustrate locality check between the HDCP Transmitter and HDCP receiver [Device B] Deleted: s HDCP Transmitter [Device A] HDCP Receiver [Device B] Generate r, values to the commetted HDCP Transmitter and HDCP receiver [Device B] Figure 2.4 Locality Check between HDCP Transmitter and HDCP receiver [Device B] Figure 2.4 Locality Check between HDCP Transmitter and HDCP Receiver [Device B] HDCP Transmitter [Device A] HDCP Transmitter [Device A] HDCP Receiver [Device B] Figure 2.4 Locality Check between HDCP Transmitter and HDCP Receiver [Device B] HDCP Transmitter [Device A] HDCP Transmitter [Device A] HDCP Receiver [Device B] Generate r, watchog inner Send RTT_Challenge Send RTT_Challenge Send most significant 128-bits of L = most significant 128-bits of L		-	r evnires before	
value with the most significant 128-bits of L and locality check fails if there is a mismatch An HDCP Repeater initiates locality check on all its downstream HDCP-protected interface ports by sending unique r, values to the connected HDCP Devices. Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5 illustrate locality check between the HDCP Transmitter and HDCP, the effective of the connected HDCP Devices. HDCP Transmitter [Device A] HDCP Transmitter [Device A] Figure 2.4. Locality Check between HDCP Transmitter and HDCP Receiver HDCP Transmitter [Device A] HDCP Transmiter [Device A] HDCP Transmitter [De				Formatted: Subscript
by sending unique r_n values to the connected HDCP Devices. Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5 illustrate locality check between the HDCP Transmitter and HDCP \rightarrow Deleted: s Receiver. HDCP Transmitter [Device A] HDCP Receiver [Device B] Generate r_n locality check: LC_Init Set watchdog timer a (Compute L = HMACSHA256(r_n , kgXOR r_n)) Verify L = L' Figure 2.4. Locality Check between HDCP Transmitter and HDCP Receiver HDCP Transmitter [Device A] HDCP Receiver [Device B] HDCP Receiver [Device B] Generate r_n locality check: LC_Init Compute L = HMACSHA256(r_n , kgXOR r_n) Verify L = L' HDCP Transmitter [Device A] HDCP Receiver [Device B] Generate r_n locality check: LC_Init Compute L = HMACSHA256(r_n , kgXOR r_n) Send RTT_Challenge Set watchdog timer a local transmitter [Device A] HDCP Receiver [Device B] Verify most significant 128-bits of L = most significant 128-bits of L = most	value with the most significant 128-bits			
Receiver. HDCP Transmitter [Device A] HDCP Receiver [Device B] Generate r_n initiate incality check: LC_Init Set watchdog timer Generate r_n initiate LC_Send L_prime Compute L = HMAC-SHA256(r_n , k _a XOR r_n) Verify L = L' HDCP Transmitter [Device A] HDCP Transmitter and HDCP Receiver HDCP Transmitter [Device A] HDCP Receiver [Device B] Generate r_n initiate incality check: LC_Init Compute L = HMAC-SHA256(r_n , k _a XOR r_n) Send RTT_Ready Send RTT_Challenge Send RTT_Challenge Send RTT_Challenge Send most significant 128-bits of L': LC_Send_L_prime			d interface ports	
$HDCP Transmitter [Device A] HDCP Receiver [Device B]$ $I = HMAC-SHA256(r_{r_{r_{r_{k}}}}k_{k}XOR r_{r_{0}}) + IC-Send L-prime Compute L' = HMAC-SHA256(r_{r_{r_{k}}}k_{k}XOR r_{r_{0}}) + IC-Send L-prime Compute L' = HMAC-SHA256(r_{r_{k}}k_{k}XOR r_{r_{0}}) + IC-Send RTT_Ready + IC-SHA256(r_{r_{k}}k_{k}XOR r_{r_{0}}) + IC-SHA256(r_{r_{k}}k_{k}XOR r_{r_{0}}) + IC-Send RTT_Ready + IC-SHA256(r_{r_{k}}k_{k}XOR r_{r_{0}}) + IC-SEnd RTT_Ready + IC-SHA256(r_{r_{k}}k_{k}XOR r_{r_{0}}) + IC-SEnd RTT_Ready + IC-SHA256(r_{r_{k}}k_{k}XOR r_{r_{0}}) + IC-SEND RECEIVER [IC-SHA256(r_{r_{k}}k_{k}XOR r_{r_{0}}) + IC-SEND RECEIVER [IC-SHA256(r_{k}k_{k}XOR r_{r_{0}}) + IC-SEND RECEIVER $	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	k between the HDCP Transm	tter and HDCP	Deleted: s
Generate r_n Set watchdog timer Compute L = HMAC-SHA256(r_n , k_a XOR r_n) Verify L = L' HDCP Transmitter [Device A] HDCP Transmitter [Device A] HDCP Receiver [Device B] Generate r_n Compute L = HMAC-SHA256(r_n , k_a XOR r_n) Send RTT_Ready Send RTT_Challenge Set watchdog timer Verify most significant 128-bits of L: RTT_Challenge Verify most significant 128-bits of L: RTT_Challenge Verify most significant 128-bits of L: RTT_Challenge Verify most significant 128-bits of L: RTT_Challenge				
$\begin{array}{c} & \begin{array}{c} & \end{array} \\ \hline \\ \\ & \end{array} \\ \hline \\ & \end{array} \\ \hline \\ \\ \\ \\ & \end{array} \\ \hline \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\$	HDCP Transmitter [Device A]	HDCP Re	ceiver [Device B]	
Compute L = HMAC-SHA256($r_n, k_d XOR r_n$) Verify L = L' Figure 2.4. Locality Check between HDCP Transmitter and HDCP Receiver HDCP Transmitter [Device A] HDCP Receiver [Device B] Generate r_n Generate r_n Send RTT_Challenge Send RTT_Challenge Send most significant 128-bits of L = most significant 128-bits of L = most Signific	Generate r _n localit Set watchdog timer	ty check: LC_Init		
Generate r_n Initiate locality check: LC_Init Compute L = HMAC-SHA256(r_n, k_d XOR r_{r_0}) Send RTT_Ready Send RTT_Challenge Send least significant 128-bits of L: RTT_Challenge Verify most significant 128-bits of L = most significant 128-bits of L': LC_Send_L_prime Send most significant 128-bits of L': LC_Send_L_prime		LC_Send_L_prime Compute L'	=HMAC-SHA256(r _n , k _d XO	$R r_{rx}$)
Generate r_n Initiate locality check: LC_Init Compute L = HMAC-SHA256(r_n , k_d XOR r_m) Send RTT_Ready Send RTT_Challenge Send least significant 128- bits of L: RTT_Challenge Verify most significant 128-bits of L = most significant 128-bits of L = most significant 128-bits of L = most Send most significant 128-bits of L'	ē .	HDCP Transmitter	and HDCP	
Generate r_n locality check: LC_Init Compute L = HMAC-SHA256(r_n , k_d XOR r_n) Send RTT_Ready Send RTT_Challenge Send least significant 128-bits of L: RTT_Challenge Send most significant 128-bits of L = most significant 128-bits of L': LC_Send_L prime Send most significant 128-bits of L	HDCP Transmitter [Device A]	HDCP Re	ceiver [Device B]	
Send RTT_Challenge bits of L: RTT_Challenge Set watchdog timer bits of L: RTT_Challenge Verify most significant 128-bits of L = most significant 128-bits of L'	Generate r _n localit	ty check: LC_Init Compute L'	= HMAC-SHA256(r _n , k _d XO	R <i>r</i> _m)
Verify most significant 128-bits of L = most significant 128-bits of L' \checkmark	Send RTT_Challenge bits of			
significant 128-bits of L'	of			
Figure 2.5. Locality Check between HDCP Transmitter and HDCP Receiver (Pre-compute	significant 128-bits of L'	nsmitter and HDCP Receive	r (Pre-compute	
L and L') If the HDCP Transmitter is HDCP 2.0-compliant or if the TRANSMITTER LOCALITY PRECOMPUTE SUPPORT bit received as part of the	L and L'llf the HDCP Transmitter	is HDCP 2.0-compliant	or if the	Formatted: Font: Italic

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HDCP Interface Independent Adaptation Specification Revision 2.1. Digital Content Protection LLC		Deleted: Oct 23, 2008
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AKE_Transmitter_Info message is set to zero or the receiver has set the RECEIVER LOCALITY PRECOMPUTE SUPPORT bit to zero in its AKE Receiver Info message, the HDCP Receiver		Deleted: An
		Deleted. All
• Computes a 256-bit value $L' = \text{HMAC-SHA256}(r_n, \text{k}_d \text{XOR } r_{rx}).$		
• Sends LC_Send_L_prime message containing 256-bit L'.		
If the TRANSMITTER LOCALITY_PRECOMPUTE SUPPORT bit received as part of the AKE_Transmitter_Info message is set to one and the receiver has set the		
<u>RECEIVER LOCALITY PRECOMPUTE SUPPORT bit to one in its AKE Receiver Info</u> message, the HDCP Receiver		
• Computes 256-bit $L' = \text{HMAC-SHA256}(r_n, k_d \text{XOR } r_m)$		Formatted: Bullets and Numbering
		Formatted: Font: Italic
Sends RTT_Ready message to the transmitter when L' calculation is complete and the receiver is ready for the RTT Challenge.		Formatted: Font: Italic
receiver is ready for the RTT Challenge.		
• On receiving the RTT_Challenge message from the transmitter, if the value received in the RTT_Challenge message matches the least significant 128 bits of L', the receiver		Formatted: Bulleted + Level: 1 + Aligned at: 1" + Tab after: 1.25" + Indent at: 1.25"
sends an LC_Send_L_prime message containing the most significant 128-bits of L'.]	Formatted: Font: Italic
To the same of a locality, the definition due to consider in a fate control day times on the to estimate the	<u> </u>	Formatted: Font: Italic
In the case of a locality check failure due to expiration of the watchdog timer <u>or due to mismatch</u> of L and L' (or the most significant 128-bits of L and L') at the HDCP Transmitter, locality check		Formatted: Font: Italic
may be reattempted by the HDCP Transmitter for a maximum of 1023 additional attempts (for a	57.	
maximum allowed 1024 total trials) with the transmission of an LC_Init message containing a new	N	Formatted: Font: Italic
r_n . Failure of locality check on the first attempt and subsequent zero or more reattempts results in		Deleted: must
an authentication failure and the authentication protocol is aborted	N 1	Deleted: times
2.4 Session Key Exchange		Deleted: a total of
Successful completion of AKE and locality check stages affirms to HDCP Transmitter that the	111	Deleted: due to timeout
HDCP Receiver is authorized to receive HDCP Content. Session Key Exchange (SKE) is initiated		Deleted: for 1024 trials
by the HDCP Transmitter after a successful locality check. The HDCP Transmitter sends encrypted session Key to the HDCP Receiver at least 200 ms before enabling HDCP Encryption		Deleted: (See Section 2.7 on handling authentication failures)
and beginning the transmission of HDCP Content, HDCP Encryption may be enabled 200 ms after the transmission of the encrypted Session Key to the HDCP Receiver and at no time prior. Content encrypted with the Session Key k_3 starts to flow between the HDCP Transmitter and HDCP		Deleted: A locality check failure due to mismatch of L and L' also results in an authentication failure and the authentication protocol is aborted.
Receiver. HDCP Encryption must be enabled only after successful completion of AKE, locality	111	Deleted: s
check and SKE stages.	11 11	Deleted: k
During SKE, the HDCP Transmitter	11/1	Deleted: and enables HDCP Encryption
	111	Deleted: after sending encrypted session key
• Generates a pseudo-random 128-bit Session k_s and 64-bit pseudo-random number r_{iv} .	11	Deleted: s
• Performs key derivation as explained in Section 2.7 to generate 128-bit dkey ₂ where	in i N	Deleted: k
• Performs key derivation as explained in Section 2.7 to generate 128-on $dkey_2$ where $dkey_2$ is the derived key when $ctr = 2$.		Deleted: k
• Computes 128-bit $E_{dkey}(k_s) = k_s \text{XOR}$ (dkey ₂ XOR r_{rx}), where r_{rx} is XORed with the least-significant 64-bits of dkey ₂ .	Χ.	Deleted: k
• Sends SKE_Send_Eks message containing $E_{dkey}(k_s)$ and r_{iv} to the HDCP Receiver.		
On receiving SKE_Send_Eks message, the HDCP Receiver		

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number is represented in the RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID list message by the DEVICE_COUNT value. An HDCP-protected Interface Port with no active device connected adds nothing to the list. Also, the Receiver ID of the HDCP Repeater itself at any level is not included in its own Receiver ID list. An HDCP-protected Interface Port connected to an HDCP Receiver that is not an HDCP Repeater adds the Receiver ID of the connected HDCP Receiver to the list. HDCP-protected Interface Ports that have an HDCP Repeater connected add the Receiver ID list received from the connected downstream HDCP Repeater, plus the Receiver ID of the connected downstream HDCP Repeater itself.

In order to add the Receiver ID list of the connected downstream HDCP Repeater, it is necessary for the HDCP Repeater to verify the integrity of the list. If the connected HDCP Repeater is not an HDCP 2.0-compliant Device, the HDCP Repeater verifies the integrity of the list by computing V and checking the most significant 128-bits of V against the most significant 128 bits of V received as part of the RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message from the connected downstream HDCP Repeater. If the connected HDCP Repeater is an HDCP 2.0-compliant Device, the HDCP Repeater verifies the integrity of the list by computing V and comparing V against V. If the values do not match, the downstream Receiver ID list integrity check fails, and the HDCP Repeater must not add the Receiver ID list received from the downstream HDCP Repeater to its Receiver ID list

When the HDCP Repeater has assembled the complete list of Receiver IDs of connected and active HDCP Devices with which the HDCP Repeater has successfully completed the authentication protocol, it computes the 256-bit verification value V'.

An HDCP Repeater connected to an HDCP 2.0-compliant upstream HDCP Transmitter and an HDCP Transmitter connected to an HDCP 2.0-compliant HDCP Repeater computes respective V' and V values as given below. HMAC-SHA256 is computed over the concatenation of Receiver ID DEPTH, list. DEVICE_COUNT, MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED and MAX CASCADE EXCEEDED received as part of the RepeaterAuth Send ReceiverID List message. The key used for HMAC is kd.

(or V) = HMAC-SHA256(Receiver ID list || DEPTH || DEVICE_COUNT MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED || MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED, kd)

An HDCP Repeater connected to an upstream HDCP Transmitter that is not HDCP 2.0-compliant and an HDCP Transmitter connected to an HDCP Repeater that is not HDCP 2.0-compliant computes respective V' and V values as given below. HMAC-SHA256 is computed over the concatenation of Receiver ID list, DEPTH, DEVICE COUNT, MAX DEVS EXCEEDED, HDCP2_0_REPEATER_DOWNSTREAM, MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED, HDCP1 DEVICE DOWNSTREAM and seg num V received as part of RepeaterAuth Send ReceiverID List message. The key used for HMAC is kd

(or V) = HMAC-SHA256(Receiver ID list || DEPTH || DEVICE_COUNT MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED 11 HDCP2 0 REPEATER DOWNSTREAM || HDCP1 DEVICE DOWNSTREAM || sea num V. k_d)

Receiver ID list is formed by appending downstream Receiver IDs in big-endian order. When the Receiver ID list, V', DEPTH, DEVICE_COUNT and if applicable, HDCP2_0_REPEATER_DOWNSTREAM and HDCP1_DEVICE_DOWNSTREAM are available, the HDCP Repeater sends RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message to the upstream HDCP Transmitter. The HDCP Repeater sends V' if the upstream transmitter is HDCP 2.0-compliant and the most significant 128-bits of V' if the upstream transmitter is not HDCP 2.0compliant.

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In order to add the Receiver ID list of the connected HDCP Repeater, it is necessary for the HDCP Repeater to verify the integrity of the list

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RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message to the upstream HDCP Transmitter

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V' = HMAC-SHA256(Receiver ID list || DEPTH || DEVICE_COUNT || MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED || MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED, kd)

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The HDCP Repeater initializes seq_num_V to 0 at the beginning of the HDCP Session i.e. after r_{tx} is received. It is incremented by one after the transmission of every RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message. seq_num_V must never be reused during an HDCP Session for the computation of V (or V). If seq_num_V rolls over, the HDCP Transmitter must detect the roll-over in the RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List received from the HDCP Repeater and the transmitter must disable HDCP Encryption if encryption is enabled, restart authentication by the transmission of a new r_{tx} as part of the AKE_Init message.

When an HDCP Repeater receives HDCP2 0 REPEATER DOWNSTREAM = 'true' or HDCP1 DEVICE DOWNSTREAM = 'true' from a downstream HDCP Repeater, it must propagate this information to the upstream HDCP Transmitter by setting the corresponding values to 'true' in the RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message.

If HDCP2 0 REPEATER DOWNSTREAM = 'true' or HDCP1_DEVICE_DOWNSTREAM = 'true', the Upstream Content Control Function may instruct the most upstream HDCP Transmitter to abort the transmission of certain HDCP encrypted Type 1 Content Streams. The most upstream HDCP Transmitter must be prepared to process the request and immediately cease the transmission of specific Content Streams as instructed by the Upstream Content Control Function.

Whenever the RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message is received, the HDCP Transmitter verifies the integrity of the Receiver ID list by computing V and comparing either V and V' (if the connected HDCP Repeater is HDCP 2.0-compliant) or the most significant 128-bits of V and V' (if the connected HDCP Repeater is not HDCP 2.0-compliant). If the values do not match, authentication fails, the authentication protocol is aborted and HDCP Encryption is disabled.

On successful verification of Receiver ID list and topology information, i.e. if the values match, none of the reported *Receiver ID*s are in the current revocation list (in the case of the most upstream HDCP Transmitter), the HDCP Transmitter does not detect a roll-over of *seq_num_V*, the downstream topology does not exceed specified maximums (explained below) and the HDCP Repeater is not HDCP 2.0-compliant, the HDCP Transmitter sends the least significant 128-bits of V to the HDCP Repeater as part of the RepeaterAuth Send_Ack_message. Every RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List_message from the repeater to the transmitter must be followed by a RepeaterAuth_Send_Ack_message from the transmitter to repeater on successful verification of ReceiverID list and topology information by the transmitter.

The RepeaterAuth Send Ack message must be received by the HDCP Repeater within 200 ms from the transmission of the RepeaterAuth Send ReceiverID List message to the HDCP Transmitter if the HDCP Transmitter is not HDCP 2.0-compliant. A match between the least significant 128-bits of V and V' indicates successful upstream transmission of topology information. If a mismatch occurs or the RepeaterAuth Send Ack message is not received by the repeater within 200 ms, the HDCP Repeater must send the Receiver AuthStatus message with the REAUTH REQ set to 'true' and must transition in to an unauthenticated state (See Section 2.10.3).

If the upstream HDCP Transmitter receives a Receiver AuthStatus message with REAUTH REQ set to 'true', it may initiate re-authentication with the HDCP Repeater by the transmission of a new L_{PQ}

After transmitting the SKE Send Eks message, the HDCP Transmitter, having determined that REPEATER received earlier in the protocol is 'true', sets a three second watchdog timer. If the RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message is not received by the HDCP Transmitter within a maximum-permitted time of three seconds after transmitting SKE_Send_Eks message, authentication of the HDCP Repeater fails. With this failure, the HDCP Transmitter disables HDCP Encryption and aborts the authentication protocol with the HDCP Repeater,

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Deleted: V is not equal to V'

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
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
When an HDCP Receiver (including HDCP Repeater) is connected to the HDCP Repeater or when a connected, active HDCP Receiver with which the HDCP Repeater has successfully completed the authentication protocol is disconnected from the HDCP Repeater and the upstream HDCP Transmitter is not HDCP 2.0-compliant, the HDCP Repeater must send the RepeaterAuth Send ReceiverID List message to the upstream HDCP Transmitter which must include the Receiver IDs of all connected and active downstream HDCP Receivers with which the HDCP Repeater has successfully completed the authentication protocol. This enables upstream propagation of the most recent topology information after changes to the topology without interrupting the transmission of HDCP Content.

Refer to Table 2.2 for the HDCP Repeater upstream and downstream propagation time.

The HDCP Repeater propagates topology information upward through the connection tree to the HDCP Transmitter. An HDCP Repeater reports the topology status variables DEVICE_COUNT and DEPTH. The DEVICE_COUNT for an HDCP Repeater is equal to the total number of connected downstream HDCP Receivers and HDCP Repeaters. The value is calculated as the sum of the number of directly connected downstream HDCP Receivers and HDCP Repeaters. The DEPTH status for an HDCP Repeater is equal to the maximum number of connection levels below any of the downstream HDCP-protected Interface Ports. The value is calculated as the maximum DEPTH reported from downstream HDCP Repeaters plus one (accounting for the connected downstream HDCP Repeater).

In Figure 2.7, R1 has three downstream HDCP Receivers connected to it. It reports a DEPTH of one and a DEVICE_COUNT of three.







In Figure 2.8, R1 reports a DEPTH of two and a DEVICE_COUNT of four.

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


Figure 2.8. DEPTH and DEVICE_COUNT for HDCP Repeater

HDCP Repeaters must be capable of supporting DEVICE_COUNT values of up to 31 and DEPTH values of up to 4. If the computed DEVICE_COUNT for an HDCP Repeater exceeds 31, the error is referred to as MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED error. The repeater sets MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED = 'true' in the RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message. If the computed DEPTH for an HDCP Repeater exceeds four, the error is referred to as MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED error. The repeater sets MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED = 'true' in the RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message. When an HDCP Repeater receives a MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED or a MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED error from a downstream HDCP Repeater, it must propagate the error to the upstream HDCP Transmitter and must not transmit V' (or the most significant 128-bits of V'), DEPTH, DEVICE_COUNT, Receiver ID list and if applicable. HDCP2_0_REPEATER_DOWNSTREAM and HDCP1_DEVICE_DOWNSTREAM.

Authentication fails if the topology maximums are exceeded. HDCP Encryption is disabled and the authentication protocol is aborted. The top-level HDCP Transmitter, having already performed SRM integrity check during AKE, proceeds to see if the *Receiver ID* of any downstream device from the Receiver ID list is found in the current revocation list, and, if present, authentication fails, HDCP Encryption is disabled and authentication protocol is aborted.

SKE_Send_Eks1 SKE_Send_Eks2 SKE_Send_Eks3 Transmitter RepeaterAuth_ Send_ReceiverID SKE_Send_Eks2 SKE_Send_Eks3			-				autic	
Send_ReceiverID Send_ReceiverID		SKE_Send_Eks1	SKE_Send_Eks2		SKE_Send_Eks3			
	Transmi	Send_ReceiverID	Send_ReceiverID	Repeater		Rec	eiver	

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Figure 2.9. HDCP Repeater Protool Timing Requirements

<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>Max</u> Delay	Conditions and Comments
SKE_Send_Eks1	SKE_Send_Eks2	<u>100 ms</u>	Downstream propagation time.
Session Key	ks generated by		

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received from Upstream HDCP Transmitter SKE_Send_Eks3 k _z transmitted to all downstream HDCP-protected Interface Ports	HDCP Repeater transmitted downstream RepeaterAuth_Se nd_ReceiverID_L ist1 Receiver IDs and topology information transmitted upstream	<u>200 ms</u>	Upstream propagation time when no downstream HDCP Repeaters are attached (no downstream Receiver ID lists to process)
RepeaterAuth_Sen d_ReceiverID_List 1 Downstream Receiver IDs and topology information received	RepeaterAuth_Se nd_ReceiverID_L ist2 Receiver IDs and topology information transmitted upstream	<u>200 ms</u>	Upstream propagation time when one or more HDCP Repeaters are attached. From latest downstream RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message. (downstream Receiver ID lists must be processed)
<u>SKE_Send_Eks1</u> <u>Upstream HDCP</u> <u>Transmitter</u> <u>transmits k_s</u>	RepeaterAuth Se nd ReceiverID L ist2 Upstream HDCP Transmitter receives RepeaterAuth Se nd ReceiverID L ist message	<u>1.2</u> seconds	For the Maximum of four repeater levels, 4 * (100 ms + 200 ms)

Table 2.2. HDCP Repeater Protocol Timing Requirements

Table 2.2 specifies HDCP Repeater timing requirements that bound the worst-case propagation time for the Receiver ID list. A maximum delay of three seconds has been provided, to receive the RepeaterAuth Send ReceiverID List message by the upstream transmitter, to account for authentication delays due to the presence of downstream receivers that have not been paired with the upstream HDCP Repeater. Note that because each HDCP Repeater does not know the number of downstream HDCP Repeaters, it must use the same three-second timeout used by the upstream HDCP Transmitter for receiving the RepeaterAuth Send ReceiverID List message.

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2.5.2 Downstream Propagation of Content Stream Management Information




Figure 2.10. Downstream Propagation of Content Stream Management Information

The HDCP Transmitter may transmit multiple Content Streams to an HDCP Receiver during an HDCP Session. The HDCP Transmitter may use the same Session Key, k_{33} negotiated during the HDCP Session for HDCP Encryption of the Content Streams.

The HDCP Transmitter propagates Content Stream management information, which includes Type values assigned to Content Streams, using the RepeaterAuth Stream Manage message to the attached HDCP Repeater only if the attached HDCP Repeater is not an HDCP 2.0-compliant Device. The HDCP Transmitter executes this step after successful completion of Session Key Exchange and before beginning the transmission of a Content Stream after HDCP Encryption to the HDCP Repeater. The RepeaterAuth Stream Manage message from an HDCP Transmitter to the attached HDCP Repeater identifies restrictions, as specified by the Upstream Content Control Function, on the transmission of Content Streams to specific devices.

Type values are assigned to all Content Streams by the most upstream HDCP Transmitter based on instructions received from the Upstream Content Control Function. The exact mechanism used by the Upstream Content Control Function to instruct the HDCP Transmitter is outside the scope of this specification. Type 0 Content Streams (see Section 4.2.15) may be transmitted by the HDCP Repeater to all HDCP Devices. Type 1 Content Streams (see Section 4.2.15) must not be transmitted by the HDCP Repeater through its HDCP-protected Interface Ports connected to HDCP 1.x-compliant Devices and HDCP 2.0-compliant Repeaters.

The most upstream HDCP Transmitter must not transmit Type 1 Content Streams to HDCP 1.xcompliant Devices and HDCP 2.0-compliant Repeaters as instructed by the corresponding Upstream Content Control Function.

The HDCP Transmitter must send the RepeaterAuth Stream Manage message specifying Type values assigned to Content Streams, to the attached HDCP Repeater at least 100ms before the transmission of the corresponding Content Streams after HDCP Encryption. The HDCP Transmitter must only send the RepeaterAuth Stream Manage message corresponding to encrypted Content Streams it will transmit to the HDCP Repeater. The HDCP Transmitter initializes *seq_num M* to 0 at the beginning of the HDCP Session i.e. after r_{ts} is sent. It is incremented by one after the transmission of every RepeaterAuth Stream Manage message.

On receiving the RepeaterAuth Stream Manage message, the HDCP Repeater computes *M*' as given below. HMAC-SHA256 is computed over the concatenation of STREAMID_TYPE (see Section 4.2.15) and *seq_num_M* values received as part of the RepeaterAuth Stream Manage message. All values are in big-endian order. The key used for HMAC is SHA256(k_d). *seq_num_M*

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must never be reused during an HDCP Session for the computation of M' (or M). If seq_num_M rolls over, the HDCP Transmitter must disable HDCP Encryption if encryption is enabled, restart authentication by the transmission of a new r_{xx} as part of the AKE_Init message.

<u>M' (or M) = HMAC-SHA256(STREAMID_TYPE || seq_num_M, SHA256(k_d))</u>.

<u>M' must be sent by the HDCP Repeater to the HDCP Transmitter as part of the RepeaterAuth Stream Ready message.</u>

The HDCP Transmitter must receive the RepeaterAuth Stream Ready message within 100 ms after the transmission of RepeaterAuth Stream Manage message. Every RepeaterAuth Stream Manage message from the transmitter to the repeater must be followed by a RepeaterAuth Stream Ready message from the repeater to the transmitter.

When the RepeaterAuth Stream Ready message is received, the HDCP Transmitter verifies the integrity of the message by computing M and comparing this value to M'. If M is equal to M', the HDCP Transmitter may transmit the Content Streams identified in the corresponding RepeaterAuth Stream Manage message. If the RepeaterAuth Stream Ready message is not received within 100 ms or if M is not equal to M', the HDCP Transmitter must not transmit the Content Stream Manage message.

An HDCP Repeater connected to an HDCP 2.0-compliant Transmitter or an HDCP 1.x-compliant Transmitter will not receive the RepeaterAuth Stream Manage message from the transmitter. In this case, the HDCP Repeater must assign a Type value of 0x00 to all Content Streams received from the HDCP Transmitter.

The HDCP Repeater must in turn propagate the received Content Stream management information using the RepeaterAuth_Stream_Manage message further downstream.

2.6 Link Synchronization

After successful completion of SKE, HDCP Encryption is enabled and encrypted content starts to flow between the HDCP Transmitter and the HDCP Receiver. As explained in Section 3.4, the presence of the PES Header HDCP Private Data block indicates that HDCP Encryption is enabled and the PES payload is encrypted. Once encrypted content starts to flow, a periodic Link Synchronization is performed to maintain cipher synchronization between the HDCP Transmitter and the HDCP Receiver.

Link Synchronization is achieved every time a PES Header is transmitted, by the inclusion of *inputCtr* and *streamCtr* in the header. (See Section 3.4 for details about *inputCtr* and *streamCtr*). The HDCP Receiver updates its *inputCtr* corresponding to the stream (as indicated by the *streamCtr* value) with the *inputCtr* value received from the transmitter.

2.7 Key Derivation

Key derivation is illustrated in Figure 2.11.

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On an authentication failure at the HDCP Transmitter during the authentication protocol, the protocol must be aborted, if HDCP Encryption is enabled, it must be immediately disabled. Authentication must be reattempted at least once by the top-level HDCP Transmitter by the transmission of a new rtx as part of the AKE_Init message. An exception to this rule is in the case of authentication failure due to failure of SRM integrity check or if the Receiver ID of an connected downstream HDCP Device is in the revocation list. Authentication need not be re-attempted in these cases. The HDCP Repeater initiates re-authentication on its downstream HDCP-protected interface ports only when it receives a re-authentication request i.e. a new r_{tx} value as part of the AKE_Init message, from upstream.¶

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


Figure 2.11. Key Derivation

 r_{tx} and ctr are in big-endian order. ctr is a 64-bit counter and is initialized to 0 at the beginning of the HDCP Session i.e. after r_{tx} is sent or received. It is incremented by one after every derived key computation. dkey_i is the 128-bit derived key when ctr = i. ctr must never be reused during an HDCP Session.

 r_n is initialized to 0 during AKE i.e. during the generation of dkey₀ and dkey₁. It is set to a pseudorandom value during locality check as explained in Section 2.3. The pseudo-random r_n is XORed with the least-significant 64-bits of k_m during generation of dkey₂.

2.8 HDCP Transmitter State Diagram

As explained in Section 1.3, the HDCP Transmitter may support simultaneous connections to HDCP Receivers through one or more of its HDCP-protected interface ports. The HDCP Transmitter state diagram is implemented independently on each HDCP-protected interface port.

The HDCP Transmitter Link State Diagram and HDCP Transmitter Authentication Protocol State Diagram (Figure 2.12 and Figure 2.13) illustrate the operation states of the authentication protocol for an HDCP Transmitter that is not an HDCP Repeater. For HDCP Repeaters, the downstream (HDCP Transmitter) side is covered in Section 2.10.2.

Transmitter's decision to begin authentication is dependent on events such as detection of an HDCP Receiver, availability of premium content or other implementation dependent details in the transmitter. In the event of authentication failure, an HDCP Receiver must be prepared to process subsequent authentication attempts. The HDCP Transmitter may cease to attempt authentication for transmitter-specific reasons, which include receiving a Receiver Disconnected Indication or after a certain number of authentication re-attempts by the transmitter.


The transmitter must not initiate authentication unless it determines that the receiver is HDCPcapable. The method used by the HDCP Transmitter to determine whether the receiver is HDCPcapable is outside the scope of this specification.

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	HDCP T	ransmitter	
	Main Fu	inction	
Sub- Function	Sub- Function	Sub- Function	Sub- Functior
HDC	tion on each P Transmit	ter State Di	agram
Figure 2.10. I	IDCP Transi	nitter Functio	<u> </u>
			H0: No Rx
		Δ	ttached
		Reset	► <u>Rece</u>
	Receiver	Disconnec	ted
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


Figure 2.13. HDCP Transmitter Authentication Protocol State Diagram

Transition Any State:H0. Reset conditions at the HDCP Transmitter or disconnect of the <u>connected</u> HDCP capable receiver cause the HDCP Transmitter to enter the No Receiver Attached state.

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Transition H0:H1. The detection of a sink device (through Receiver Connected Indication) indicates to the transmitter that a sink device is connected and ready to display the received content. When the receiver is no longer active, the transmitter is notified through Receiver Disconnected Indication.

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State H1: Transmit Low-value Content. In this state the transmitter should begin sending an unencrypted signal with HDCP Encryption disabled. The transmitted signal can be a low value content or informative on-screen display. This will ensure that a valid video signal is displayed to the user before and during authentication. At any time a Receiver Connected Indication received from the connected HDCP 2.0-compliant HDCP Repeater causes the transmitter to transition in to this state.

Transition H1:A0. If content protection is desired by the Upstream Content Control Function, then the HDCP Transmitter should immediately attempt to determine whether the receiver is HDCP capable.

State A0: Determine Rx HDCP Capable. The transmitter determines that the receiver is HDCP capable. This step may be defined as part of the setup and discovery procedures and is outside the scope of this specification. If state A0 is reached when content protection is desired by the Upstream Content Control Function, authentication must be started immediately by the transmitter if the receiver is HDCP capable. A valid video screen is displayed to the user with encryption disabled during this time.

Transition A0:H1. If the receiver is not HDCP capable, the transmitter continues to transmit low value content or informative on-screen display.

Transition A0:A1. If the receiver is HDCP capable, the transmitter initiates the authentication protocol.

State A1: Exchange k_m . In this state, the HDCP Transmitter initiates authentication by sending AKE_Init message containing r_{tx} to the HDCP Receiver_and sends AKE_Transmitter_Info message to the HDCP Receiver. It receives AKE_Send_Cert from the receiver containing REPEATER and *cert_{rx}* and AKE_Receiver_Info message (if the HDCP Receiver is not HDCP 2.0-compliant). If the HDCP Transmitter does not receive AKE_Receiver_Info message within 100 ms of the transmittion of AKE_Transmitter_Info message, it indicates that the HDCP Receiver is an HDCP 2.0-compliant Device.

If the HDCP Transmitter does not have k_m stored corresponding to the *Receiver ID*, it generates $E_{kpub}(km)$ and sends $E_{kpub}(km)$ as part of the AKE_No_Stored_km message to the receiver after verification of signature on *cert_{rx}*. It performs integrity check on the SRM and checks to see whether the *Receiver ID* of the connected HDCP Device is in the revocation list. It receives AKE_Send_rrx message containing r_{rx} from the receiver. It computes H, receives AKE_Send_H_prime message from the receiver containing H' within one second after sending AKE_No_Stored_km to the receiver and compares H' against H.

If the HDCP Transmitter has k_m stored corresponding to the *Receiver ID*, it sends AKE_Stored_km message containing $E_{kh}(k_m)$ and *m* to the receiver, performs integrity check on the SRM, checks to see whether the *Receiver ID* of the connected HDCP Device is in the revocation list, and receives r_{rx} as part of AKE_Send_rrx message from the receiver. It computes H, receives AKE_Send_H_prime message from the receiver containing *H*' within 200 ms after sending AKE_Stored_km to the receiver and compares *H*' against H.

If the HDCP Transmitter does not have a k_m stored corresponding to the *Receiver ID*, it implements pairing with the HDCP Receiver as explained in Section 2.2.1.

Transition A1:H1. This transition occurs on failure of signature verification on *cert_{ra}*, failure of SRM integrity check, if *Receiver ID* of the connected HDCP Device is in the revocation list or if there is a mismatch between H and H'. This transition also occurs if AKE_Send_H_prime message is not received within one second after sending AKE_No_Stored_km or within 200 ms after sending AKE_Stored_km to the receiver.

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Transition A1:A2. The HDCP Transmitter implements locality check after successful completion of AKE and pairing.

State A2: Locality Check. In this state, the HDCP Transmitter implements the locality check as explained in Section 2.3 with the HDCP Receiver.

Transition A2:H1. This transition occurs on <u>one or more consecutive locality check failures</u>. Locality check fails when L' (or the most significant 128-bits of \underline{L}') is not received within 7 ms and the watchdog timer at the HDCP Transmitter expires or on a mismatch between L and L' (or the most significant 128-bits of \underline{L}').

Transition A2:A3. The HDCP Transmitter implements SKE after successful completion of locality check.

State A3: Exchange k_s . The HDCP Transmitter sends encrypted Session Key, $E_{dkey}(k_s)$, and r_{iv} to the HDCP Receiver as part of the SKE_Send_Eks message. It may enable HDCP Encryption 200 ms after sending encrypted Session Key. HDCP Encryption must be enabled only after successful completion of AKE, locality check and SKE stages.

Transition A3:A4. This transition occurs after completion of SKE.

State A4: Test for Repeater. The HDCP Transmitter evaluates the REPEATER value that was received in State A1.

Transition A4:A5. REPEATER is 'false' (the HDCP Receiver is not an HDCP Repeater).

State A5: Authenticated. At this time, and at no prior time, the HDCP Transmitter has completed the authentication protocol.

A periodic Link Synchronization is performed to maintain cipher synchronization between the HDCP Transmitter and the HDCP Receiver.

Transition A4:A6. REPEATER is 'true' (the HDCP Receiver is an HDCP Repeater).

State A6: Wait for Receiver ID List. The HDCP Transmitter sets up a three-second watchdog timer after sending SKE_Send_Eks.

Transition A6:H1. The watchdog timer expires before the RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List is received.

Transition A6:A7. RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message is received.

State A7: Verify Receiver ID List. If a transition in to this state occurs from State A6, the watchdog timer is cleared. If both MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED and MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED are not 'true', computes V. If the connected HDCP Repeater is HDCP 2.0-compliant, compares V and V. If the connected HDCP Repeater is not HDCP 2.0compliant, compares the most significant 128-bits of V and V'. The Receiver IDs from the Receiver ID list are compared against the current revocation list. Transition A7:H1. This transition is made if a mismatch occurs between V and V' (if the connected HDCP Repeater is HDCP 2.0-compliant) or the most significant 128-bits of V and V' (if the connected HDCP Repeater is not HDCP 2.0compliant). This transition is also made if any of the Receiver IDs in the Receiver ID list are found in the current revocation list or if the HDCP Transmitter detects a roll-over of seq num V (if the repeater is not HDCP 2.0-compliant). A MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED or MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED error also causes this transition.

Deleted: initiates locality check by sending LC_Init message containing *r_n* to the HDCP Receiver, sets it watchdog timer to 7 ms and computes L. On receiving LC_Send_L_prime message from the receiver, it compares *L*' against L

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Transition A7:A5. This transition occurs if <u>the connected</u> <u>compliant</u> , on <u>successful verification of V and V', none of the current revocation list</u> , and the downstream topology does not explore the transition of the tr	ne reported Receiver IDs are in the		Deleted: ==
Transition A7:A8. This transition occurs if the connected compliant, on successful verification of the most significant reported <i>Receiver IDs</i> are in the current revocation list, the H roll-over of <i>seq_num_V</i> and the downstream topology does not	128-bits of V and V', none of the DCP Transmitter does not detect a		Formatted: Font: Bold
State A8: Send Receiver ID list acknowledgement. , The significant 128-bits of V to the HDCP Repeater as part of the R The RepeaterAuth Send Ack message must be received by	epeaterAuth Send Ack message. the HDCP Repeater within 200 ms		
from the transmission of the RepeaterAuth Send Receive Transmitter. <u>Transition A8:A9. This transition occurs after the Repeater</u> sent to the repeater.	•		Formatted: Font: Bold
Transition A5:H1. This transition occurs if a Receiv REAUTH REQ set to 'true' is received.	er AuthStatus message with the		Formatted: Font: Bold
Transition A5:A7. This transition occurs whenever a Remeasured from the connected HDCP Repeater that is			Formatted: Font: Bold
State A9; Content Stream Management. This stage is impli- transmitted and the connected HDCP Repeater is not H Transmitter sends the RepeaterAuth Stream Manage message Content Streams, to the attached HDCP Repeater at least 10 corresponding Content Streams after HDCP Encr RepeaterAuth Stream Ready message from the HDCP R transmission of RepeaterAuth Stream Manage message and RepeaterAuth Stream Ready message is not received within 1	HDCP 2.0-compliant. The HDCP especifying Type values assigned to Oms before the transmission of the yption. It must receive the epeater within 100 ms after the verifies M' . This step fails if the		Formatted: Font: Bold Formatted: Font: Italic
This stage may be implemented in parallel with the upstream p (State A4, State A6, State A7 and State A8) and with the f Synchronization (State A5). This state may be implemented a state diagram. A transition in to this state may occur from State State A8 if Content Stream is to be transmitted and the conno 2.0-compliant. Also, the transition from State A9 must return undisrupted operation.	bropagation of topology information low of encrypted content and Link asynchronously from the rest of the A4, State A5, State A6, State A7 or ected HDCP Repeater is not HDCP		
Note: The HDCP Transmitter must not transmit Type 1 Contended Devices and HDCP 2.0-compliant Repeaters as instructed by the Control Function.			
Transition A9:A5. This transition occurs on success or failure stage.	of the Content Stream management		Formatted: Font: Bold
Transition A9:H1. This transition occurs if seq num M rolls of	over		Formatted: Font: Bold
Note: Since <u>upstream propagation of topology information (St</u> <u>A8) and Content Stream management (State A9) stages may</u> flow of encrypted content and Link Synchronization, the link	be implemented in parallel with the		Formatted: Font: Italic Deleted: authentication with repeaters is
A5) <u>may</u> be implemented asynchronously from the rest of the		=	Deleted: must

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State A5 may occur from any state for which encryption is currently enabled. Also, the transition from State A5 returns to the appropriate state to allow for undisrupted operation.

The HDCP Transmitter may support simultaneous connections to HDCP Receivers through one or more of its HDCP-protected interface ports. It may share the same session key and r_{iv} across all its HDCP-protected interface ports, as explained in Section 3.7. However, the HDCP Transmitter must ensure that each connected HDCP Receiver receives distinct k_m and r_{tx} values.

2.9 HDCP Receiver State Diagram

The operation states of the authentication protocol for an HDCP Receiver that is not an HDCP Repeater are illustrated in Figure 2.14**Error! Reference source not found.** For HDCP Repeaters, the upstream (HDCP Receiver) side is covered in Section 2.10.3.

The HDCP Receiver must be ready to re-authenticate with the HDCP Transmitter at any point in time. In particular, the only indication to the HDCP Receiver of a re-authentication attempt by the HDCP Transmitter is the reception of an r_{tx} as part of the AKE_Init message from the HDCP Transmitter.




Figure 2.14. HDCP Receiver Authentication Protocol State Diagram

Transition Any State:B0. Reset conditions at the HDCP Receiver cause the HDCP Receiver to enter the unauthenticated state.

State B0: Unauthenticated. The HDCP Receiver is awaiting the reception of r_{tx} from the HDCP Transmitter to trigger the authentication protocol.

Transition B0:B1. r_{tx} is received as part of the AKE_Init message from the HDCP Transmitter.

State B1: Compute k_m . In this state, the HDCP Receiver sends AKE_Send_Cert message in response to AKE_Init, <u>sends AKE Receiver Info message to the transmitter if</u> <u>AKE_Transmitter_Info message is received from the transmitter</u>, generates and sends r_{rx} as part of AKE_Send_rrx message. If AKE_No_Stored_km is received, it decrypts k_m with kpriv_{rx}, calculates H'. It sends AKE_Send_H_prime message immediately after computation of H' to ensure that the message is received by the transmitter within the specified one second timeout at the transmitter.

If the HDCP Receiver does not receive AKE_Transmitter_Info message before the reception of AKE_No_Stored_km or AKE_Stored_km message, it indicates that the HDCP Transmitter is an HDCP 2.0-compliant Device.

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The HDCP System places the following constraints on the number of HDCP Devices and levels of HDCP Repeaters in the topology. <#>Up to four levels of HDCP Repeaters and as many as 32 total HDCP Devices, including HDCP Repeaters, are allowed to be connected to an HDCPprotected Interface port; and ¶ <#>An instance of an Upstream Content Control Function transmits a content stream to the HDCP Transmitter. For every such content stream received and encrypted by the HDCP System, the HDCP Transmitter is allowed to transmit the generated HDCP Content stream to up to four levels of HDCP Repeaters and as many as 32 total HDCP Devices, including HDCP Repeaters.¶ The first constraint is met by implementing the authentication protocol independently on each HDCP-protected interface port and verifying that the DEPTH and DEVICE_COUNT read from the connected repeater are less than or equal to 4 and 31 respectively (HDCP Transmitter sub-function). To meet the second constraint, the HDCP Transmitter (that is not an HDCP Repeater) performs an additional step after all its HDCP-protected interface ports have reached the terminal states of the authentication protocol i.e. State H0 (unconnected), State H1 (inactive or unauthenticated) and State A5 (authenticated). This is the main HDCP Transmitter function. For each of its HDCP-protected interface ports connected to an HDCP Repeater that have reached the authenticated state, State A5 and that will transmit the content stream received from a specific instance of the Upstream Content Control Function, the HDCP Transmitter computes the total number of HDCP Devices connected to each HDCPprotected interface port by incrementing the received DEVICE_COUNT on those ports by one (to account for the connected HDCP Repeater). Total_Port_Device_Count = DEVICE_COUNT + 19 It then computes the total number of HDCP Devices

Deleted: <#>Main HDCP Transmitter Function¶

It then computes the total number of HDCP Dev connected to the HDCP Transmitter as follows¶ Total Transmitter Device Count =

Total_Port_Device_Count_ + \dots +

Total_Port_Device_Count_n, where n is the total number of HDCP-protected interface ports on the transmitter.¶

If the computed Total_Transmitter_Device_Count exceeds 32, the top-level HDCP Transmitter disables encryption and aborts the HDCP Session on all its

HDCP-protected interface ports. The state diagram (Figure 2.13) and the description below relates to the main HDCP Transmitter function.

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If AKE_Stored_km is received, the HDCP Receiver decrypts $E_{kh}(k_m)$ to derive k_m and calculates H'. It sends AKE_Send_H_prime message immediately after computation of H' to ensure that the message is received by the transmitter within the specified 200 ms timeout at the transmitter

If AKE_No_Stored_km is received, this is an indication to the HDCP Receiver that the HDCP Transmitter does not contain a k_m stored corresponding to its *Receiver ID*. It implements pairing with the HDCP Transmitter as explained in Section 2.2.1.

Transition B1: B1. Should the HDCP Transmitter send an AKE_Init while the HDCP Receiver is in State B1, the HDCP Receiver abandons intermediate results and restarts computation of k_m .

Transition B1: B2. The transition occurs when r_n is received as part of LC_Init message from the transmitter.

State B2: Compute *L*'. The HDCP Receiver computes *L*' required during locality check and sends LC_Send_L_prime message.

Transition B2: B1. Should the HDCP Transmitter send an AKE_Init while the HDCP Receiver is in State B2, the HDCP Receiver abandons intermediate results and restarts computation of k_m .

Transition B2: B3. The transition occurs when SKE_Send_Eks message is received from the transmitter.

State B3: Compute k_s . The HDCP Receiver decrypts $E_{dkey}(k_s)$ to derive k_s .

Transition B3: B1. Should the HDCP Transmitter send an AKE_Init while the HDCP Receiver is in State B3, the HDCP Receiver abandons intermediate results and restarts computation of k_m .

Transition B3: B4. Successful computation of k_s transitions the receiver into the authenticated state.

State B4: Authenticated. The HDCP Receiver has completed the authentication protocol. Periodically, it updates its *inputCtr* corresponding to the stream (as indicated by the *streamCtr* value) with the *inputCtr* value received from the transmitter.

Transition B4: B1. Should the HDCP Transmitter send an AKE_Init while the HDCP Receiver is in State B4, the HDCP Receiver abandons intermediate results and restarts computation of k_m .

2.10 HDCP Repeater State Diagrams

The HDCP Repeater has one HDCP-protected Interface connection to an upstream HDCP Transmitter and one or more HDCP-protected Interface connections to downstream HDCP Receivers. The state diagram for each downstream connection (Figure 2.15 and Figure 2.16) is substantially the same as that for the host HDCP Transmitter (Section 2.8), with the exception that the HDCP Repeater is not required to check for downstream Receiver IDs in a revocation list.

When the upstream HDCP-protected interface port of the HDCP Repeater is in an unauthenticated state, it signals the detection of an active downstream HDCP Receiver to the upstream HDCP Transmitter by propagating the Receiver Connected Indication to the upstream HDCP Transmitter.

Whenever authentication is initiated by the upstream HDCP Transmitter by sending AKE_Init, the HDCP Repeater immediately initiates authentication on all its downstream HDCP-protected interface ports if its downstream ports are in an unauthenticated state.

The HDCP Repeater may cache the latest Receiver ID list and topology information received from its downstream ports. Whenever authentication is attempted by the upstream transmitter by Formatted: Bullets and Numbering

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authentication downstream when it receives an authentication request from upstream, rather than at detection of an HDCP Receiver on the downstream HDCP-protected Interface Port.

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Deleted: Similarly, when re-authentication is attempted by the upstream transmitter by sending a new r_{n} , the HDCP Repeater immediately initiates re-authentication on all its downstream ports.

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the downstream HDCP Repeater connection is

the upstream HDCP Transmitter when HDCP Content is flowing. The disconnected indication

must be propagated to the upstream HDCP

connected to the HDCP Repeater.¶ Receiver Connected Indication when HDCP

disconnected, the resulting Receiver Disconnected

Indication must not be propagated by the repeater to

Transmitter once the flow of HDCP Content stops or

if there are no more authenticated HDCP Receivers

Receiver is Re-connected. When an authenticated

HDCP Receiver is disconnected and reconnected to the downstream port of the HDCP Repeater i.e. the

downstream port of the repeater detects the same

Receiver ID, and there were no intervening reauthentication requests from the upstream HDCP Transmitter during the time the HDCP Receiver was disconnected, the HDCP Repeater need not propagate the Receiver Connected Indication to the upstream HDCP Transmitter. The HDCP Repeater

may initiate authentication, complete the authentication protocol with the connected HDCP

Receiver and enable HDCP Encryption.

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sending an r_{tx} value, the HDCP Repeater may propagate the cached Receiver ID list upstream without initiating a re-authentication on all its downstream ports.

The HDCP Repeater must generate unique k_m values for HDCP Devices connected to each of its downstream HDCP-protected interface ports.


If an HDCP Repeater has no active downstream HDCP Devices, it must authenticate as an HDCP Receiver with REPEATER set to 'false' if it wishes to receive HDCP Content, but must not pass HDCP Content to downstream devices.

2.10.1 Propagation of Topology Errors,

MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED and MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED: HDCP Repeaters must be capable of supporting DEVICE_COUNT values of up to 31 and DEPTH values of up to 4. If the computed DEVICE_COUNT for an HDCP Repeater exceeds 31, the error is referred to as MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED error. The repeater sets MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED = 'true' in the RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message. If the computed DEPTH for an HDCP Repeater exceeds four, the error is referred to as MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED error. The repeater sets MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED = 'true' in the RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message. When an HDCP Repeater receives a MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED or a MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED error from a downstream HDCP Repeater, it must propagate the error to the upstream HDCP Transmitter and must not transmit V' and Receiver ID list.

2.10.2 HDCP Repeater Downstream State Diagram

In this state diagram and its following description, the downstream (HDCP Transmitter) side refers to the HDCP Transmitter functionality within the HDCP Repeater for its corresponding downstream HDCP-protected Interface Port.



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Receiver Disconnected Indication

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


Figure 2.16. HDCP Repeater Downstream Authentication Protocol State Diagram

Transition Any State:P0. Reset conditions at the HDCP Repeater or disconnect of the connected HDCP capable receiver cause the HDCP Repeater to enter the No Receiver Attached state for this port.

Transition P0:P1. The detection of a sink device (through Receiver Connected Indication) indicates that the receiver is available and active (ready to display received content). When the receiver is no longer active, the downstream (HDCP Transmitter) side is notified through Receiver Disconnected Indication.

State P1: Transmit low-value content. In this state the downstream side should begin sending the unencrypted video signal received from the upstream HDCP Transmitter with HDCP Encryption disabled. At any time a Receiver Connected Indication received from the connected HDCP 2.0-compliant HDCP Repeater causes the downstream side to transition in to this state.

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received from the connected downstream HDCP
Repeater also causes this transition.

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Transition P1:F0. Upon an Upstream Authentication Request, the downstream side should immediately attempt to determine whether the receiver is HDCP capable.

State F0: Determine Rx HDCP Capable. The downstream side determines that the receiver is HDCP capable. This step may be defined as part of the setup and discovery procedures and is outside the scope of this specification. If state F0 is reached upon an Upstream Authentication Request, authentication must be started immediately by the downstream side if the receiver is HDCP capable. A valid video screen is displayed to the user with encryption disabled during this time.

Transition F0:P1. If the receiver is not HDCP capable, the downstream side continues to transmit low value content or informative on-screen display received from the upstream HDCP Transmitter.

Transition F0:F1. If the receiver is HDCP capable, the downstream side initiates the authentication protocol.

State F1: Exchange k_m . In this state, the downstream side initiates authentication by sending AKE_Init message containing r_{tx} to the HDCP Receiver_and sends AKE Transmitter Info message to the HDCP Receiver. It receives AKE_Send_Cert from the receiver containing REPEATER and *cert_{rx}* and AKE_Receiver_Info message (if the HDCP Receiver is not HDCP 2.0-compliant). If the downstream side does not receive AKE_Receiver_Info message within 100 ms of the transmittion of AKE_Transmitter_Info message, it indicates that the HDCP Receiver is an HDCP 2.0-compliant Device.

If the downstream side does not have k_m stored corresponding to the *Receiver ID*, it generates $E_{kpub}(km)$ and sends $E_{kpub}(km)$ as part of the AKE_No_Stored_km message to the receiver after verification of signature on *cert_{rx}*. It receives AKE_Send_rrx message containing r_{rx} from the receiver. It computes H, receives AKE_Send_H_prime message from the receiver containing H' within one second after sending AKE_No_Stored_km to the receiver and compares H' against H.

If the downstream side has k_m stored corresponding to the *Receiver ID*, it sends AKE_Stored_km message containing $E_{kh}(k_m)$ and *m* to the receiver and receives r_{rx} as part of AKE_Send_rrx message from the receiver. It computes H, receives AKE_Send_H_prime message from the receiver containing *H*' within 200 ms after sending AKE_Stored_km to the receiver and compares *H*' against H.

If the downstream side does not have a k_m stored corresponding to the *Receiver ID*, it implements pairing with the HDCP Receiver as explained in Section 2.2.1.

Transition F1:P1. This transition occurs on failure of signature verification on *cert_{rx}* or if there is a mismatch between H and H'. This transition also occurs if AKE_Send_H_prime message is not received within one second after sending AKE_No_Stored_km or within 200 ms after sending AKE_Stored_km to the receiver.

Transition F1:F2. The downstream side implements locality check after successful completion of AKE and pairing.

State F2: Locality Check. In this state, the downstream side, <u>implements the locality check as</u> explained in Section 2.3 with the HDCP Receiver.

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previously authenticated HDCP Receiver is reconnected and there were no intervening reauthentication requests from the upstream HDCP Transmitter during the time the HDCP Receiver was disconnected, the downstream side may initiate authentication with the HDCP Receiver without waiting for an Upstream Authentication Request.¶

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	Transition F2:P1. This transition occurs on <u>one or more</u> Locality check fails when L' (or the most significant 128-bit and the watchdog timer at the downstream side expires or on a most significant 128-bits of L').	s of L') is not received within 7 ms	 Deleted: three
	Transition F2:F3. The downstream side implements SKE af check.	ter successful completion of locality	
	State F3: Exchange k_s . The downstream side sends encrypted HDCP Receiver as part of the SKE_Send_Eks message. It may after sending encrypted <u>Session Key</u> . HDCP Encryption mut completion of AKE, locality check and SKE stages.	ay enable HDCP Encryption 200 ms	Deleted: s Deleted: s Deleted: s
	Transition F3:F4. This transition occurs after completion of S	SKE.	Deleted: s Deleted: k
	State F4: Test for Repeater. The downstream side evalua received in State F1.	tes the REPEATER value that was	
	Transition F4:F5. REPEATER is 'false' (the HDCP Received	r is not an HDCP Repeater).	
	State F5: Authenticated . At this time, and at no prior time, the authentication protocol	the downstream side has completed	 Deleted: and is fully operational, able to delive
	A periodic Link Synchronization is performed to maintain downstream side and the HDCP Receiver.	cipher synchronization between the	HDCP Content
	Transition F4:F6. REPEATER is 'true' (the HDCP Receiver	is an HDCP Repeater).	
	State F6: Wait for Receiver ID List. The downstream side so after sending SKE_Send_Eks.	ets up a three-second watchdog timer	
	Transition F6:P1. The watchdog timer expires before the R is received.	epeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List	
	Transition F6:F7. RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List mes	sage is received.	
	State F7: Verify Receiver ID List. If a transition in to the watchdog timer is cleared. If both	his state occurs from State F6, the_ MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED and	 Deleted: T
	MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED are not 'true', computes V, HDCP 2.0-compliant, compares V and V'. If the connected compliant, compares the most significant 128-bits of V and V'.	HDCP Repeater is not HDCP 2.0-	 Deleted: , and verifies $V == V'$
	added to the Receiver ID list for this HDCP Repeater. The u informed if topology maximums are exceeded.		
	Transition F7:P1. This transition is made if a mismatch connected HDCP Repeater is HDCP 2.0-compliant) or the mo the connected HDCP Repeater is not HDCP 2.0-compliant) downstream side detects a roll-over of <i>seq_num V</i> (if the repe MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED or MAX_DEVS_EXCEED	ist significant 128-bits of V and V' (if . This transition is also made if the eater is not HDCP 2.0-compliant). A	 Deleted: <i>V</i> != <i>V</i> '
	Transition F7:F5. This transition is made if <u>the connect</u> <u>compliant, on successful verification of V and V' and the do</u> specified maximums.	ed HDCP Repeater is HDCP 2.0-	 Deleted: <i>V</i> == <i>V</i> ',
	Transition F7:F8. This transition occurs if the connected compliant, on successful verification of the most significant 1		
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side does not detect a roll-over of seq_num_V and the downstream topology does not exceed specified maximums.

State F8: Send Receiver ID list acknowledgement., The downstream side sends the least significant 128-bits of *V* to the HDCP Repeater as part of the RepeaterAuth_Send_Ack message.

The RepeaterAuth Send Ack message must be received by the HDCP Repeater within 200 ms from the transmission of the RepeaterAuth Send ReceiverID List message to the downstream side.

Transition F8:F9. This transition occurs after the RepeaterAuth Send Ack message has been sent to the repeater.

Transition F5:P1. This transition occurs if a Receiver AuthStatus message with the <u>REAUTH_REQ</u> set to 'true' is received.

Transition F5:F7. This transition occurs whenever a RepeaterAuth Send ReceiverID List message is received from the connected HDCP Repeater that is not HDCP 2.0-compliant.

State F9: Content Stream Management. This stage is implemented if Content Stream is to be transmitted and the connected HDCP Repeater is not HDCP 2.0-compliant. The downstream side propagates the Content Stream management information, received from the upstream transmitter, using the RepeaterAuth_Stream_Manage message to the attached HDCP Repeater at least 100ms before the transmission of the corresponding Content Streams after HDCP Encryption. If the upstream transmitter is HDCP 2.0-compliant or HDCP 1.x-compliant, the downstream side will not receive the RepeaterAuth_Stream_Manage message from the upstream transmitter and assigns a Type value of 0x00 to all Content Streams received from the upstream transmitter and propagates the Content Stream management information using the RepeaterAuth_Stream_Manage message.

The downstream side must receive the RepeaterAuth Stream Ready message from the HDCP Repeater within 100 ms after the transmission of RepeaterAuth Stream Manage message and verifies M'. This step fails if the RepeaterAuth Stream Ready message is not received within 100 ms or if M is not equal to M'.

This stage may be implemented in parallel with the upstream propagation of topology information (State F4, State F6, State F7 and State F8) and with the flow of encrypted content and Link Synchronization (State F5). This state may be implemented asynchronously from the rest of the state diagram. A transition in to this state may occur from State F4, State F5, State F6, State F7 or State F8 if Content Stream is to be transmitted and the connected HDCP Repeater is not HDCP 2.0-compliant and the Content Stream management information is received from the upstream HDCP Transmitter. Also, the transition from State F9 must return to the appropriate state to allow for undisrupted operation.

Note: Type 1 Content Streams must not be transmitted by the downstream side through its HDCPprotected Interface Ports connected to HDCP 1.x-compliant Devices and HDCP 2.0-compliant Repeaters.

Transition F9:F5. This transition occurs on success or failure of the Content Stream management stage.

Transition F9:P1. This transition occurs if *seq_num_M* rolls over.

Note: Since upstream propagation of topology information (State F4, State F6, State F7 and State F8) and Content Stream management (State F9) stages may be implemented in parallel with the flow of encrypted content and Link Synchronization, the link synchronization process (i.e. State

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F5) <u>may</u> be implemented asynchronously from the rest of the state diagram. The transition into State F5 <u>may</u> occur from any state for which encryption is currently enabled. Also, the transition from <u>State</u> F5 returns to the appropriate state to allow for undisrupted operation.

2.10.3 HDCP Repeater Upstream State Diagram

The HDCP Repeater upstream state diagram, illustrated in Figure 2.17, makes reference to states of the HDCP Repeater downstream state diagram. In this state diagram and its following description, the upstream (HDCP Receiver) side refers to the HDCP Receiver functionality within the HDCP Repeater for its corresponding upstream HDCP-protected Interface Port.




Figure 2.17. HDCP Repeater Upstream Authentication Protocol State Diagram

Transitions Any State:C0. Reset conditions at the HDCP Repeater cause the HDCP Repeater to enter the unauthenticated state. Re-authentication is forced any time AKE_Init is received from the connected HDCP Transmitter, with a transition through the unauthenticated state.

State C0: Unauthenticated. The device is idle, awaiting the reception of r_{tx} from the HDCP Transmitter to trigger the authentication protocol.


Transition C0:C1. r_{tx} is received as part of the AKE_Init message from the HDCP Transmitter.

State C1: Compute k_m . In this state, the upstream (HDCP Receiver) side sends AKE_Send_Cert message in response to AKE_Init, <u>sends AKE Receiver Info message to the transmitter if AKE_Transmitter Info message is received from the transmitter</u>, generates and sends r_{rx} as part of AKE_Send_rrx message. If AKE_No_Stored_km is received, it decrypts k_m with kpriv_{rx}, calculates

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Deleted: If a previously authenticated HDCP Receiver connected to the downstream HDCPprotected interface port is re-connected and there were no intervening re-authentication requests from the upstream HDCP Transmitter during the time the HDCP Receiver was disconnected, the upstream side need not transition to the unauthenticated state. The downstream side may authenticate the connected HDCP Receiver, as explained in Section 2.11.1.¶ When all downstream HDCP-protected interface ports transition to the unconnected state, the upstream becomes unauthenticated and propagates the resulting Receiver Disconnected Indication to the upstream HDCP Transmitter.¶

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H'. It sends AKE_Send_H_prime immediately after computation of *H*' to ensure that the message is received by the transmitter within the specified one second timeout at the transmitter

If the upstream side does not receive AKE Transmitter Info message before the reception of AKE No Stored km or AKE Stored km message, it indicates that the HDCP Transmitter is an HDCP 2.0-compliant Device.

If AKE_Stored_km is received, the upstream side decrypts $E_{kin}(k_m)$ to derive k_m and calculates H'. It sends AKE_Send_H_prime message immediately after computation of H' to ensure that the message is received by the transmitter within the specified 200 ms timeout at the transmitter

If AKE_No_Stored_km is received, this is an indication to the upstream side that the HDCP Transmitter does not contain a k_m stored corresponding to its *Receiver ID*. It implements pairing with the HDCP Transmitter as explained in Section 2.2.1.

Transition C1:C2. The transition occurs when r_n is received as part of LC_Init message from the transmitter.

State C2: Compute L'. The upstream side computes L' required during locality check and sends LC_Send_L_prime message.

Transition C2: C3. The transition occurs when SKE_Send_Eks message is received from the transmitter.

State C3: Compute k_s . The upstream side decrypts $E_{dkey}(k_s)$ to derive k_s .

Transition C3: C4. Successful computation of k_s causes this transition.

State C4: Wait for Downstream. The upstream state machine waits for all downstream HDCPprotected Interface Ports of the HDCP Repeater to enter the unconnected (State P0), unauthenticated (State P1), or the authenticated state (State F5).

Transition C4:C5. All downstream HDCP-protected Interface Ports with connected HDCP Receivers have reached the state of authenticated, unconnected or <u>unauthenticated</u> state.

State C5: Assemble Receiver ID List. The upstream side assembles the list of all connected downstream topology HDCP Devices as the downstream HDCP-protected Interface Ports reach terminal states of the authentication protocol. An HDCP-protected Interface Port that advances to State P0, the unconnected state, or P1, the <u>unauthenticated state</u>, does not add to the list. A downstream HDCP-protected Interface Port that arrives in State F5 that has an HDCP Receiver that is not an HDCP Repeater connected, adds the *Receiver ID* of the connected HDCP Repeater connected will cause the Receiver ID list read from the connected HDCP Repeater, plus the *Receiver ID* of the connected HDCP Repeater, plus the *Receiver ID* of the connected HDCP Repeater itself, to be added to the list.

Note: The upstream side may add the Receiver ID list read from the HDCP Repeater connected to the downstream HDCP-protected Interface port, plus the *Receiver ID* of the connected HDCP Repeater itself to the list after the downstream port has transitioned in to State F8,

When the Receiver ID list for all downstream HDCP Receivers has been assembled, the upstream side computes DEPTH, DEVICE_COUNT and the upstream V' and sends RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message to the upstream HDCP Transmitter. In the case of a MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED or a MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED error, it does not transmit V' (or the most significant 128-bits of V'), DEPTH, DEVICE_COUNT, Receiver ID_list and if applicable, HDCP2_0_REPEATER_DOWNSTREAM and

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Deleted: Transition C4:C0. The watchdog timer expires before all downstream HDCP-protected Interface Ports enter the authenticated, unconnected or inactive state.

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HDCP1_DEVICE_DOWNSTREAM. When an HDCP Repeater receives a MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED or MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED error from a downstream HDCP Repeater, it is required to inform the upstream HDCP Transmitter.

If any downstream port connected to an HDCP Repeater receives HDCP2 0 REPEATER DOWNSTREAM = 'true' or HDCP1 DEVICE DOWNSTREAM = 'true', the upstream side sets the corresponding values to 'true' in the RepeaterAuth Send_ReceiverID List message to the upstream HDCP Transmitter.

Transition C5:C6. RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message has been sent to the upstream HDCP Transmitter and topology maximums are not exceeded and upstream transmitter is not HDCP 2.0-compliant.

Transition C5:C8. RepeaterAuth Send ReceiverID List message has been sent to the upstream HDCP Transmitter and topology maximums are not exceeded and upstream transmitter is HDCP 2.0-compliant.

State C6. Verify Receiver ID list acknowledgement. In this state, the upstream side receives the RepeaterAuth Send Ack message from the upstream transmitter and compares the least significant 128-bits of *V* and *V*. A match between the least significant 128-bits of *V* and *V* indicates successful upstream transmission of topology information. The RepeaterAuth Send Ack message must be received by the upstream side within 200 ms from the transmission of the RepeaterAuth Send ReceiverID List message to the upstream transmitter if the transmitter is not HDCP 2.0-compliant.

Transition C6:C0. This transition occurs if the RepeaterAuth_Send_Ack message is not received by the upstream side within 200 ms or on a mismatch between the least significant 128-bits of Vand V. If this transition occurs, the upstream side must send the Receiver_AuthStatus message with the REAUTH_REQ set to 'true' to the upstream transmitter.

Transition C6:C7. This transition occurs if the RepeaterAuth_Send_Ack message is received by the upstream side within 200 ms, on a successful match between the least significant 128-bits of V and V and if Content Stream management information is received from the upstream transmitter.

Transition C6:C8. This transition occurs if the RepeaterAuth Send Ack message is received by the upstream side within 200 ms and on a successful match between the least significant 128-bits of *V* and *V*.

State C7; Content Stream Management. On receiving the RepeaterAuth Stream Manage message, the upstream side computes *M'* and sends it to the upstream Transmitter as part of the RepeaterAuth Stream Ready message.

This stage may be implemented in parallel with the upstream propagation of topology information (State C4, State C5 and State C6) and with the flow of encrypted content and link synchronization (State C8). This state may be implemented asynchronously from the rest of the state diagram. A transition in to this state may occur from State C4, State C5, State C6 or State C8 if Content Stream management information is received from the upstream transmitter. Also, the transition from State C7 may return to the appropriate state to allow for undisrupted operation.

The upstream side must be prepared to implement this stage in parallel with the upstream propagation of topology information and with the flow of encrypted content and link synchronization if these stages are implemented in parallel by the upstream transmitter.

Deleted: Transition C5:C0. All authentication failures on the downstream side, connection of a new, active HDCP Receiver on the downstream HDCP-protected interface port that previously did not have an active downstream HDCP Receiver connected, reception of a Receiver Connected Indication on the downstream side from the connected HDCP Repeater or transition of all downstream ports to the unconnected state cause this transition. This transition also occurs when topology maximums are exceeded. Authentication failures are indicated by Transition F1:P1, Transition F2:P1, Transition F6:P1 and Transition F7:P1.¶

If a previously authenticated HDCP Receiver connected to the downstream HDCP-protected interface port is re-connected and there were no intervening re-authentication requests from the upstream HDCP Transmitter during the time the HDCP Receiver was disconnected, the upstream side need not transition to the unauthenticate dstate. The downstream side may authenticate the connected HDCP Receiver, as explained in Section 2.11.1.¶

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State C3: Authenticated. The upstream side has completed the authentication protoc Periodically, it updates its <i>inputCtr</i> corresponding to the <u>elementary</u> stream (as indicated by t <i>streamCtr</i> value) with the <i>inputCtr</i> value received from the transmitter.		- Deleted: 6
Transition C8:C5. This transition occurs only if the upstream HDCP Transmitter is not HDC 2.0-compliant and on detection of any changes to the topology.	<u>P</u>	Formatted: Font: Bold
This transition occurs when a downstream port that was previously in the unauthenticated (Sta P1) or unconnected (State P0) state transitions in to the authenticated (State F5) state. For examp the transition may occur when a new HDCP Receiver is connected to a downstream port, the previously had no receivers connected, and the downstream port completes the authenticati protocol with the HDCP Receiver.	le, at	
This transition also occurs when a downstream port that was previously in an authenticated state transitions in to an unauthenticated on unconnected state. For example, the transition may occur when an active, authenticated HDCP Receiver attached to the downstream port is disconnected.		Formatted: Font: Not Bold
Reception of a RepeaterAuth Send ReceiverID List message on a downstream port from t connected downstream HDCP Repeater also causes this transition.	<u>he</u>	
Transition C8:C0 . This transition occurs only if the upstream HDCP Transmitter is HDCP 2 compliant and on detection of any changes to the topology.	<u>0-</u>	Formatted: Font: Bold
This transition occurs when a downstream port that was previously in the unauthenticated (Sta P1) or unconnected (State P0) state transitions in to the authenticated (State F5) state. For examp the transition may occur when a new HDCP Receiver is connected to a downstream port, th previously had no receivers connected, and the downstream port completes the authenticated protocol with the HDCP Receiver. Reception of a RepeaterAuth Send ReceiverID List message on a downstream port from the connected downstream HDCP Repeater also causes this transition. If this transition occurs, the upstream side must propagate a Receiver Connected Indication to the upstream HDCP Transmitter.	le, <u>at</u> on '' he ''	Deleted: Transition C6:C0. All authentication failures on the downstream side, connection of a new, active HDCP Receiver on the downstream HDCP-protected interface port that previously did not have an active downstream HDCP Receiver connected, reception of a Receiver Connected Indication on the downstream side from the connected HDCP Repeater or transition of all downstream ports to the unconnected state cause this transition. Authentication failures are indicated by Transition F1:P1, Transition F2:P1, Transition F6:P1 and Transition F7:P1. ¶
Note: Since upstream propagation of topology information (State C4, State C5 and State C6) a Content Stream management (State C7) may be implemented in parallel with the flow encrypted content and Link Synchronization, the link synchronization process (i.e. State C8) m be implemented asynchronously from the rest of the state diagram. The transition into State may occur from any state for which encryption is currently enabled. Also, the transition from sta C8 may return to the appropriate state to allow for undisrupted operation. The upstream side must be prepared to implement the link synchronization process in parallel w	$\frac{dt}{dt} = \frac{dt}{dt} = dt$	¶ If a previously authenticated HDCP Receiver connected to the downstream HDCP-protected interface port is re-connected and there were no intervening re-authentication requests from the upstream HDCP Transmitter during the time the HDCP Receiver was disconnected, the upstream side need not transition to the unauthenticated state. The downstream side may authenticate the connected HDCP Receiver, as explained in Section 2.11.1.¶
the upstream propagation of topology information and Content Stream management if these stag are implemented in parallel by the upstream transmitter.		Deleted: authentication with repeaters
	1111 1111 1111	Deleted: is
2.11 Converters		Deleted: 6
2.11.1 HDCP 2 – HDCP 1.x Converters	1 11	Deleted: must
<u>Z.II.I</u> DUCP 2 – DUCP 1.X COnveniers	1 1	Deleted: 6

HDCP 2 – HDCP 1.x converters are HDCP Repeaters with an HDCP 2 compliant interface port on the upstream (HDCP Receiver) side and one or more HDCP 1.x compliant interface ports on the downstream (HDCP Transmitter) side.

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The HDCP 1.x compliant downstream side implements the state diagram explained in the corresponding HDCP 1.x specification (See Section 1.5).

The HDCP 2 compliant upstream side implements the state diagram as explained in Section 2.10.3 with these modifications.

• State C5: Assemble Receiver ID List. The upstream side assembles the list of all connected downstream topology HDCP Devices as the downstream HDCP-protected Interface Ports reach terminal states of the authentication protocol. An HDCP-protected Interface Port that advances to the unconnected state or the <u>unauthenticated</u> state does not add to the list. A downstream HDCP-protected Interface Port that arrives in an authenticated state that has an HDCP Receiver that is not an HDCP Repeater connected, adds the *Bksv* of the connected HDCP Receiver to the Receiver ID list. Downstream HDCP-protected will cause the KSV list read from the connected HDCP Repeater, plus the *Bksv* of the connected HDCP Repeater itself, to be added to the list. KSVs are used in place of *Receiver ID* state and are added to the Receiver ID list in big-endian order

When the Receiver ID list (comprising KSVs of connected downstream HDCP 1.x Receivers, where the KSVs are added to the list in big-endian order) for all downstream HDCP Receivers has been assembled, the upstream side computes DEPTH, DEVICE_COUNT and the upstream V' and sends RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message to the upstream HDCP Transmitter. In the case of a MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED or a MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED error, it does not transmit V' (or the most significant 128-bits of V'), DEPTH, DEVICE_COUNT, Receiver ID_list_and_if_applicable, HDCP2 0 REPEATER DOWNSTREAM and HDCP1 DEVICE DOWNSTREAM. When an HDCP Repeater receives a MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED or MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED error from a downstream HDCP Repeater, it is required to inform the upstream HDCP Transmitter.




Figure 2.18. HDCP 2 - HDCP 1.x Repeater Protocol Timing with Receiver Attached

		•		-
<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>Max</u> Delay	Conditions and Comments	
<u>SKE_Send_Eks1</u> Session Key received from Upstream HDCP Transmitter	<u>AKSV1</u> <u>HDCP Repeater's</u> <u>Aksv transmitted</u> <u>downstream</u>	<u>100 ms</u>	Downstream propagation time.	Formatted: Font: Italic
AKSV1 HDCP Repeater's Aksv transmitted downstream	RepeaterAuth_Se nd_ReceiverID_L ist1 <u>Receiver IDs and</u> topology information transmitted	<u>200 ms</u>	Upstream propagation time when no downstream HDCP Repeaters are attached (no downstream KSV lists to process)	

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Table 2.3, HDCP 2 - HDCP 1.x Repeater Protocol Timing with Receiver Attached Formatted: Font: Bold

Transmitter RepeaterAuth_	→
	Repeater

Figure 2.19. HDCP 2 - HDCP 1.x Repeater Protocol Timing with Repeater Attached

<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>Max</u> Delay	Conditions and Comments	
<u>SKE_Send_Eks1</u> <u>Session Key</u> received from <u>Upstream HDCP</u> <u>Transmitter</u>	AKSV1 HDCP Repeater's Aksy transmitted downstream	<u>100 ms</u>	Downstream propagation time.	Formatted: Font: Italic
RDY1 Downstream <u>Receiver IDs and</u> topology information received	RepeaterAuth_Se nd_ReceiverID_L ist1 Receiver IDs and topology information transmitted upstream	<u>200 ms</u>	Upstream propagation time when one or more HDCP 1.x-compliant Repeaters are attached. From latest downstream READY. (downstream KSV lists must be processed)	

2.11.2 HDCP 1.x - HDCP 2 Converters

HDCP 1.x - HDCP 2 converters are HDCP Repeaters with an HDCP 1.x compliant interface port on the upstream (HDCP Receiver) side and one or more HDCP 2 compliant interface ports on the downstream (HDCP Transmitter) side.

The HDCP 1.x compliant upstream side implements the state diagram explained in the corresponding HDCP 1.x specification (See Section 1.5).

The HDCP 2 compliant downstream side implements the state diagram as explained in Section 2.10.2 with these modifications.

State F7: Verify Receiver ID List. If a transition in to this state occurs from State F6, the watchdog timer is cleared. If both MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED and MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED are not 'true', computes V, If the connected HDCP Repeater is HDCP 2.0-compliant, compares V and V'. If the connected HDCP Repeater is not HDCP 2.0-compliant, compares the most significant 128-bits of V and V'. The Receiver IDs from this port are used in place of KSVs and are added to the KSV list for this HDCP Repeater. KSV list is constructed by appending Receiver IDs in little-endian order. The upstream HDCP Transmitter must be informed if topology maximums are exceeded.

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Deleted: When any downstream HDCP-protected interface port transitions to the unauthenticated state as a result of authentication failures or connection of a new, active HDCP Receiver, the upstream side becomes unauthenticated.¶

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Deleted: If authentication with repeaters is SKE_Send_Eks1 AKSV1 implemented in parallel with the flow of encrypted content and Link Synchronization, the link HDCP 1.x synchronization process (i.e. State F5) must be Transmitter Receiver – HDCP 2 implemented asynchronously from the rest of the RDY1 state diagram. Repeater Deleted: ¶ Figure 2.20. HDCP 1.x – HDCP 2 Repeater Protocol Timing with Receiver Attached **From** <u>To</u> Max **Conditions and Comments** Delay AKSV1 SKE_Send_Eks1 <u>400 ms</u> Downstream propagation time. Upstream HDCP k_s generated by Transmitter Aksv HDCP Repeater transmitted received downstream SKE_Send_Eks1 <u>RDY1</u> <u>500 ms</u> Upstream propagation time when no downstream HDCP Repeaters are attached (no downstream ks generated by <u>Upstream</u> Receiver ID lists to process) HDCP Repeater **READY** asserted transmitted downstream Table 2.5. HDCP 1.x - HDCP 2 Repeater Protocol Timing with Repeater Attached SKE_Send_Eks1 AKSV1 HDCP 1.x Transmitter Repeater – HDCP 2 RDY1 Repeater List 1 Figure 2.21. HDCP 1.x - HDCP 2 Repeater Protocol Timing with Repeater Attached To **Conditions and Comments** From Max Delay AKSV1 SKE_Send_Eks1 <u>400 ms</u> Downstream propagation time. Upstream HDCP k_s generated by HDCP Repeater Transmitter Aksv Formatted: Font: Italic transmitted received downstream RepeaterAuth_Sen RDY1 500 ms Upstream propagation time when one or more d_ReceiverID_List HDCP Repeaters are attached. From latest Upstream ____ Formatted: Font: Not Italic 1 downstream **READY** asserted RepeaterAuth Send ReceiverID List message. **Downstream** (downstream Receiver ID lists must be processed) Receiver IDs and topology information received Table 2.6. HDCP 1.x – HDCP 2 Repeater Protocol Timing with Repeater Attached

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2.12 Session Key Validity

When HDCP Encryption is disabled, the transmitter and receiver ceases to perform HDCP Encryption (Section 3.4) and stops incrementing the *inputCtr*.

If HDCP Encryption was disabled, from its enabled state, due to the detection of Receiver Connected Indication, Receiver Disconnected Indication or authentication failures, the <u>HDCP Transmitter expires</u> the <u>Session Key</u>. The <u>HDCP Transmitter initiates re-authentication</u> by the transmission of a new r_{av} . In all other cases, where HDCP Encryption was disabled, from its enabled state, while the link was still active and authenticated (for e.g., HDCP Encryption may be briefly disabled during transmission of low value content), the <u>HDCP Transmitter need not expire the Session Key</u>. The HDCP Transmitter may maintain, the encryption parameters (associated with elementary streams) used during the HDCP Session i.e. *inputCtr* value after the last HDCP Encryption is re-enabled, HDCP Encryption <u>may be applied</u> seamlessly, without requiring re-authentication, by using the same encryption parameters.

If HDCP Encryption was disabled, from its enabled state, the HDCP Receiver <u>must</u> maintain k_s and r_{iv} used during the HDCP Session. If encryption was re-enabled, without intervening re-authentication requests from the transmitter, the HDCP Receiver <u>must</u> use the same k_s and r_{iv} . It <u>must</u> update its *inputCtr* corresponding to the <u>elementary</u> stream (as indicated by the *streamCtr* value) with the *inputCtr* value received from the transmitter. (See Section 2.6 on Link Synchronization).

2.13 Random Number Generation

Random number generation is required both in the HDCP Transmitter logic and in the HDCP Receiver logic. Counter mode based deterministic random bit generator using AES-128 block cipher specified in NIST SP 800-90 is the recommended random number generator. The minimum entropy requirement for random values that are not used as secret key material (i.e. r_{tx} , r_{tx} , r_{iv} , r_{n}) is 40 random bits out of 64-bits. This means that a reasonable level of variability or entropy is established if out of 1,000,000 random (r_{tx} , r_{rx} , r_{iv} , r_n) values collected after the first authentication attempt (i.e. after power-up cycles on the HDCP Transmitter or HDCP Receiver logic), the probability of there being any duplicates in this list of 1,000,000 random values is less than 50%.

For randomly generated secret key material (k_m, k_s) the minimum entropy requirement is 128-bits of entropy (i.e. the probability of there being any duplicates in the list of 2^64 secret values $(k_m \text{ or } k_s)$ collected after power-up and first authentication attempt on the HDCP Transmitter logic is less than 50%).

A list of possible entropy sources that may be used for generation of random values used as secret key material include

- a true Random Number Generator or analog noise source, even if a poor (biased) one
- a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG), seeded by a true RNG with the required entropy, where the state is stored in non-volatile memory after each use. The state must be kept secret. Flash memory or even disk is usable for this purpose as long as it is secure from tampering.

A list of possible entropy sources that may be used for generation of random values not used as secret key material include

- timers, network statistics, error correction information, radio/cable television signals, disk seek times, etc.
- a reliable (not manipulatable by the user) calendar and time-of-day clock. For example, some broadcast content sources may give reliable date and time information.

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HDCP Interface Independent Adaptation Specification May 9, 2011 Deleted: Oct 23, 2008 Revision 2.1 **Digital Content Protection LLC** Deleted: 0 **HDCP Encryption** 3 3.1 Description Figure 3.1 shows how HDCP fits in to the protocol stack. The link consists of two constituent links: a unidirectional high-speed stream transporting the AV Content, and a lower-speed Deleted: c bidirectional link used for control / status. Video Codec Audio Codec PES packetization **HDCP** HDCP Control msg



Bidirectional Reliable Message

Transport (e.g., TCP/IP)

Framing / Multiplexing (e.g., MPEG-TS or -PS)

AV Transport (e.g., RTCP/RTP/UDP/IP)

Video in the HDCP Transmitter, together with any associated audio or data streams, are carried as MPEG Packetized Elementary Streams (PES), as specified in [3]. Each PES stream is encrypted as specified in Section 3.4. One or more PES streams, together with timing and any other ancillary information, are multiplexed using a mechanism such as MPEG Transport Stream (MPEG-TS) or MPEG Program Stream (MPEG-PS), or equivalent. The multiplexed stream may be encapsulated using a mechanism such as, in the case of an IP connection, RTP [8] as described in [6]. Control and Status messages are transported over a reliable bidirectional mechanism, e.g., as specified in [5] and [9].

3.2 AV Stream

MPEG AV streams consist of Packetized Elementary Streams (PES). Associated PES streams are grouped into a Program. Aside from the AV streams, various control, status and timing and

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formatting information is also transported. Only the AV streams are is subject to HDCP Encryption.

Note: A PES Stream may contain audio or video elements encoded by one of the standard codecs enumerated in [3], or it may contain non-standard codec data using the procedures in [3] for private stream data.

3.3 Abbreviations

bslbf - as defined in [3].

uimsbf - as defined in [3].


byte - a digital word 8 bits in length.

uint - unsigned integer, an integral number of bytes in length.

bool - a parameter one byte in length. The parameter is 'true' if the least-significant bit is nonzero, and false otherwise.

3.4 HDCP Cipher

The HDCP cipher consists of a 128-bit AES module that is operated in a Counter (CTR) mode as illustrated in Figure 3.2.



 k_s is the 128-bit Session Key which is XORed with lc_{128} . All elementary streams within a given Deleted: s program use the same k_s and r_{iv} .

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 $p = (r_{iv} XOR \ streamCtr) \parallel inputCtr$. All values are in big-endian order.

streamCtr is a 32-bit counter. The HDCP Transmitter assigns a distinct *streamCtr* value for each PES. The *streamCtr* value is distinct for elementary streams within a given program and across multiple programs i.e. no two elementary streams contained in a given program or different programs can have the same *streamCtr*. The HDCP Transmitter starts with *streamCtr* value of zero for the first PES and increments *streamCtr* by one after assignment to each PES. Therefore, the first elementary stream is assigned *streamCtr* = 0, the second elementary stream is assigned *streamCtr* = 1 and so on. *streamCtr* associated with a PES is not incremented during an HDCP Session. *streamCtr* is initialized to zero after SKE and it must not be reset at any other time. It is XORed with the least significant 32-bits of r_{iv} .

inputCtr is a 64-bit counter. It is initialized to zero after SKE and must not be reset at any other time. Each elementary stream within a given program is associated with its own *inputCtr*.

HDCP Encryption must be applied to PES payload data; PES Headers must not be encrypted.

During HDCP Encryption, the key stream produced by the AES-CTR module is XORed with 128bit (16 Byte) block of payload data to produce the 128-bit encrypted output. *inputCtr* associated with an elementary stream is incremented by one following encryption of 128-bit block of payload data for that stream. The value of *inputCtr* must never be reused for a given set of encryption parameters i.e. k_s , r_i and *streamCtr*.

If inputCtr rolls over, the HDCP Transmitter must disable HDCP Encryption, abort the HDCP Session and restart authentication by the transmission of a new r_{ts} as part of the AKE Init message.

The 16 Byte encryption block boundary must be aligned with the start of the PES payload (if present) in each PES packet

Bit ordering is such that the most-significant bit of the 128-bit key stream produced by AES-CTR module is XORed with the first bit in time (as defined in [3]) in the 16 Byte payload data block.

Any PES packet containing an HDCP encrypted payload must include the 128-bit PES_private_data field in its header. It must contain the value of *streamCtr* for that stream, and the value of *inputCtr* used to encrypt the first 16 Byte block of the PES payload, as shown in **Error! Reference source not found.**Table 3.1.

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Syntax	No. of Bits	Identifier
PES_private_data() {		
reserved_bits	13	bslbf
streamCtr[3130]	2	bslbf
marker_bit	1	bslbf
streamCtr[2915]	15	bslbf
marker_bit	1	bslbf
streamCtr[140]	15	bslbf
marker_bit	1	bslbf
reserved_bits	11	bslbf
inputCtr[6360]	4	bslbf
marker_bit	1	bslbf
inputCtr[5945]	15	bslbf
marker_bit	1	bslbf
inputCtr[4430]	15	bslbf
marker_bit	1	bslbf
inputCtr[2915]	15	bslbf
marker_bit	1	bslbf
inputCtr[140]	15	bslbf
marker_bit	1	bslbf
}		

 Table 3.1. PES Header HDCP Private Data

Marker bits have a value of '1'. All bits in the reserved_bits field have a value of '0'.

Note:

- Marker bits serve to prevent packet_start_code emulation, and are used here in a form similar to their use in other PES header fields (e.g., PTS).
- The presence of the PES Header HDCP Private Data block serves to indicate that HDCP Encryption is enabled and the PES payload is encrypted. When HDCP Encryption is disabled, the PES Header HDCP Private Data block is not included.
- HDCP does not use the PES_scrambling_control bits.

3.5 HDCP Cipher Block

The HDCP cipher block consists of multiple HDCP cipher (AES-CTR) modules. The input encryption parameters to each HDCP cipher module satisfy the requirements in Section 3.4 i.e. the *streamCtr* value is distinct for each PES, an *inputCtr* is associated with each elementary stream, the same k_s and r_{iv} is used for all programs.

Figure 3.3 illustrates an HDCP cipher block used for encryption of multiple programs.

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


Figure 3.3. HDCP Encryption of Multiple Programs

3.6 MPEG System Multiplexing

This section defines procedures used when MPEG System multiplexing (MPEG-TS or MPEG PS) is used. If alternative multiplexing mechanisms are used, equivalent mechanisms for indicating HDCP operation must be used.

3.6.1 HDCP Registration Descriptor

For MPEG System multiplexing (MPEG-TS or MPEG-PS), streams subject to HDCP Encryption must include a registration descriptor of the form shown in Table 3.2. It serves to indicate that the private data in the PES header (see Table 3.1) is defined by this document.

The HDCP Transmitter must not include the registration descriptor unless it determines that the receiver is HDCP-capable.

Syntax	No. of Bits	Identifier
registration_descriptor() {		
descriptor_tag	8	0x05
descriptor_length	8	uimsbf
format_identifier	32	'HDCP'
for $(i = 0; i < N; i++)$		
HDCP_version	8	uimsbf
}		
}		

Table 3.2. HDCP Registration Descriptor

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The descriptor_length must be equal to 5, with one additional_identification_info (namely, HDCP_version) equal to 0x20.

3.6.2 Transport Stream

MPEG Transport Streams may contain multiple programs. Each program subject to HDCP Encryption must include the registration descriptor defined in Section 3.6.1 in the program loop (i.e., the "outer loop) of its PMT.

For Transport Stream, the TS headers and Adaptation fields must not be encrypted. Payload data for PIDs containing control, status, management information (e.g., PAT and PMT data) must not be encrypted. For Transport Stream, the adaptation field must be padded such that the payload (excluding the PES header, if any) is an integral multiple of 16 Bytes.

A complete AKE, Locality Check and SKE procedure is performed on one program, prior to enabling HDCP Encryption for any program. The same k_s and r_{iv} is used for all programs. Encryption may be enabled and disabled separately for each program that includes the HDCP registration descriptor in its PMT, and for PES stream within those programs.

For Transport Stream, a PES header must not exceed 184 bytes, and the Adaptation Field must not be so long as to cause the PES header to extend into the next TS packet. The 16 Byte encryption block boundary must be aligned with the start of the PES payload (if present) in each TS packet. If the last block in the encrypted TS packet is less than 16 Bytes, only the encrypted payload bytes must be transmitted; i.e., the unused key stream bits produced by the AES-CTR module must be discarded, and not carried over to a subsequent packet.

Note: This constraint simplifies packet assembly and parsing.

Note: For Transport Stream, only in the TS packet containing the end of the PES packet does the possibility exist that the last block in the packet might be less than 16 Bytes.


3.6.3 Program Stream

MPEG Program Streams contain a single program. Each program subject to HDCP <u>Encryption</u> must include the registration descriptor defined in Section 3.6.1 in the program info loop (i.e., the "outer loop") of its PSM.


3.7 Uniqueness of k_s and r_{iv}


HDCP Receivers and HDCP Repeaters with multiple inputs may share the same Public Key Certificates and Private Keys across all inputs. The HDCP Transmitter (including downstream side of HDCP Repeater) must negotiate distinct k_m with each directly connected downstream HDCP Device. While r_{tx} used during each HDCP Session is required to be fresh, transmitters with multiple downstream HDCP links must ensure that each link receives a distinct r_{tx} value.

As illustrated in Figure 3.4, HDCP Transmitters, including downstream side of HDCP Repeaters, with multiple downstream HDCP links may share the same k_s and r_{iv} across those links only if HDCP Content from the same HDCP cipher block is transmitted to those links.




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As illustrated in Figure 3.5, HDCP Transmitters, including downstream side of HDCP Repeaters, with multiple downstream HDCP links must ensure that each link receives distinct k_s and r_{iv} values if HDCP Content from different HDCP cipher blocks is transmitted to those links.



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


Figure 3.5. Unique k_s and r_{iv} across HDCP Links

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4 Authentication Protocol Messages

4.1 Control / Status Stream

Each Control/Status message begins with a msg_id field. Valid values of msg_id are shown in Table 4.1.

Message Type	msg_id Value
Null message	1
AKE_Init	2
AKE_Send_Cert	3
AKE_No_Stored_km	4
AKE_Stored_km	5
AKE_Send_rrx	6
AKE_Send_H_prime	7
AKE_Send_Pairing_Info	8
LC_Init	9
RTT_Ready	<u>10</u>
RTT_Challenge	<u>11</u>
LC_Send_L_prime	<u>12</u>
SKE_Send_Eks	<u>13</u>
RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List	<u>14</u>
RepeaterAuth_Send_Ack	<u>15</u>
RepeaterAuth_Stream_Manage	<u>16</u>
RepeaterAuth_Stream_Ready	<u>17</u>
Receiver_AuthStatus	<u>18</u>
AKE_Transmitter_Info	<u>19</u>
AKE_Receiver_Info	<u>20</u>
Reserved	<u>21</u> -31
Table 4.1. Values for msg_id	

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A reliable, bidirectional packet protocol (e.g., TCP/IP) is used to transport messages used for the HDCP authentication protocol from the HDCP Transmitter to the HDCP Receiver, and vice versa.

Each packet must contain exactly one message. Each packet payload commences with a msg_id specifying the message type, followed by parameters specific to each message.

In the case of TCP/IP, packets use an IP address and port number determined by procedures above the HDCP layer. Also, parameter values spanning more than one byte follow the convention in [5] of sending the most-significant byte first.

Note:

• The use of the Null message and Reserved values for msg_id are not defined in this specification. <u>HDCP Devices must be capable of receiving Null message and messages</u> with reserved msg_id values and must ignore these messages.



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4.2 Message Format

4.2.1 AKE_Init (Transmitter to Receiver)

Syntax	No. of Bytes	Identifier
AKE_Init {		
msg_id	1	uint
$r_{tx}[630]$	8	uint
}		
TE 11 4	A KE LAND - LAD	

Table 4.2. AKE_Init Payload

4.2.2 AKE_Send_Cert (Receiver to Transmitter)

The HDCP Receiver sets REPEATER to 'true' if it is an HDCP Repeater and 'false' if it is an HDCP Receiver that is not an HDCP Repeater. When REPEATER = 'true', the HDCP Receiver supports downstream connections as permitted by the Digital Content Protection LLC license.

Syntax	No. of Bytes	Identifier
AKE_Send_Cert {		
msg_id	1	uint
REPEATER	1	bool
$cert_{rx}[41750]$	522	uint
}		

Table 4.3. AKE_Send_Cert Payload

4.2.3 AKE_No_Stored_km (Transmitter to Receiver)

Syntax	No. of Bytes	Identifier
AKE_No_Stored_km {		
msg_id	1	uint
$E_{kpub} k_m$ [10230]	128	uint
}		

Table 4.4. AKE_No_Stored_km Payload

4.2.4 AKE_Stored_km (Transmitter to Receiver)

Syntax	No. of Bytes	Identifier
AKE_Stored_km{		
msg_id	1	uint
$E_{kh}_{km}[1270]$	16	uint
<i>m</i> [1270]	16	uint
}		

Table 4.5. AKE_Stored_km Payload

4.2.5 AKE_Send_rrx (Receiver to Transmitter)

Syntax	No. of Bytes	Identifier
AKE_Send_rrx{		
msg_id	1	uint
$r_{rx}[630]$	8	uint
}		

Table 4.6. AKE_Send_rrx Payload

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4.2.6 AKE_Send_H_prime (Receiver to Transmitter)

Syntax	No. of Bytes	Identifier
AK_Send_H_prime{		
msg_id	1	uint
H [2550]	32	uint
}		

Table 4.7. AKE_Send_H_prime Payload

4.2.7 AKE_Send_Pairing_Info (Receiver to Transmitter)

Syntax	No. of Bytes	Identifier
AKE_Send_Pairing_Info{		
msg_id	1	uint
E_{kh}_{m} [1270]	16	uint
}		

Table 4.8. AKE_Send_Pairing_Info Payload

Table 4.9. LC_Init Payload

4.2.8 LC_Init (Transmitter to Receiver)

Syntax	No. of Bytes	Identifier
LC_Init {		
msg_id $r_n[63.0]$	1	uint
$r_n[630]$	8	uint
}		

4.2.9 RTT Ready (Receiver to Transmitter)

<u>Syntax</u>	No. of Bytes	Identifier
RTT_Ready {		
msg_id	<u>1</u>	<u>uint</u>
1		
Table 4.10	RTT_Ready Payload	

4.2.10 RTT_Challenge (Transmitter to Receiver)

<u>Syntax</u>	No. of Bytes	Identifier
RTT_Challenge{		
msg_id	<u>1</u>	<u>uint</u> <u>uint</u>
L[1270]	<u>16</u>	uint
1		

Table 4.11. RTT_Challenge Payload

4.2.11 LC_Send_L_prime (Receiver to Transmitter)

If the TRANSMITTER LOCALITY PRECOMPUTE SUPPORT bit received as part of the AKE_Transmitter_Info message is set to zero or the receiver has set the RECEIVER LOCALITY_PRECOMPUTE SUPPORT bit to zero in its AKE_Receiver_Info

<u>RECEIVER_LOCALITY_PRECOMPUTE_SUPPORT bit to zero in its AKE_Receiver_Into</u> message, the HDCP Receiver constructs the LC_Send_L_prime message as given below. --- **Formatted:** Bullets and Numbering

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Syntax	No. of Bytes	Identifier
LC_Send_L_prime{		
msg_id	1	uint
L [2550]	32	uint
}		

 Table 4.12. LC_Send_L_prime Payload

 If the TRANSMITTER LOCALITY PRECOMPUTE SUPPORT bit received as part of the

 AKE Transmitter Info message is set to one and the receiver has set the

 RECEIVER LOCALITY PRECOMPUTE SUPPORT bit to one in its AKE Receiver Info

 message, the HDCP Receiver constructs the LC Send L prime message as given below.

<u>Syntax</u>	No. of Bytes	<u>Identifier</u>
LC_Send_L_prime{		
msg_id	<u>1</u>	<u>uint</u>
<i>L</i> [255128]	<u>16</u>	<u>uint</u> <u>uint</u>
1		

Table 4.13. LC_Send_L_prime Payload

4.2.12 SKE_Send_Eks (Transmitter to Receiver)

Syntax	No. of Bytes	Identifier
SKE_Send_Eks{		
msg_id	1	uint
$E_{dkey} k_{s}$ [1270]	16	uint
$r_{iv}[630]$	8	unit
}		

Table 4.14. SKE_Send_Eks Payload

<u>4.2.13</u> RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List (Receiver to Transmitter)

The HDCP Repeater constructs the RepeaterAuth Send ReceiverID List message as given in Table 4.15 T

Receiver ID list is constructed by appending *Receiver ID*s in big-endian order.

Receiver ID list = Receiver $ID_0 \parallel Receiver ID_1 \parallel \dots \parallel Receiver ID_{n-1}$, where n is the DEVICE_COUNT.

If the computed DEVICE_COUNT for an HDCP Repeater exceeds 31, the repeater sets MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED = 'true'. If the computed DEPTH for an HDCP Repeater exceeds four, the repeater sets MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED = 'true'. If topology maximums are not exceeded, MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED = 'false' and MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED = 'false'.

The HDCP Repeater sets HDCP2_0_REPEATER_DOWNSTREAM = 'true' if an HDCP 2.0compliant repeater is attached to any one of its downstream ports, else it sets HDCP2_0_REPEATER_DOWNSTREAM = 'false'.

The HDCP Repeater sets HDCP1_DEVICE_DOWNSTREAM = 'true' if an HDCP 1.x-compliant Device i.e. an HDCP 1.x-compliant Receiver or an HDCP 1.x-compliant Repeater is attached to any one of its downstream ports, else it sets HDCP1_DEVICE_DOWNSTREAM = 'false'.

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1

1

1

1

3

<u>16</u>

5

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bool

<u>uint</u>

<u>uint</u>

bool

bool

<u>uint</u>

<u>uint</u>

uint

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No. of Bytes Identifier Syntax RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List{ msg_id 1 uint MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED 1 bool MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED 1 bool if (MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED != 1 && MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED != 1) { DEVICE_COUNT 1 uint DEPTH uint 1 V[255..0] 32 uint for (j=0; j< DEVICE_COUNT; j++) { Receiver_ID_i[39..0] 5 uint } } } Table 4.15. RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List Payload No. of Bytes **Identifier Syntax** RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List{ msg_id <u>uint</u> MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED 1 bool MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED

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4.2.14 RepeaterAuth Send Ack (Transmitter to Receiver) Syntax No. of Bytes Identifier RepeaterAuth_Send_Ack{ msg_id uint 1 V[127..0] <u>16</u> <u>uint</u> } Table 4.17. RepeaterAuth_Send_Ack Payload

4.2.15 RepeaterAuth_Stream_Manage (Transmitter to Receiver)

if (MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED != 1 &&

HDCP2_0_REPEATER_DOWNSTREAM

HDCP1_DEVICE_DOWNSTREAM

for (j=0; j< DEVICE_COUNT; j++) {

Receiver_ID_i[39..0]

MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED != 1) { DEVICE_COUNT

DEPTH

<u>seq_num_V</u>

ł

V[255..128]

Content Streams are assigned a Type value by the most upstream HDCP Transmitter based on instructions received from the Upstream Content Control Function.

Table 4.16. RepeaterAuth Send ReceiverID List Payload

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Content Streams may be comprised of audio and video elementary streams. Each elementary stream is assigned a *streamCtr* value by the HDCP Transmitter which is used during HDCP Encryption of the elementary stream. The ContentStreamID, derived from the PID, for each elementary stream is associated with its corresponding *streamCtr* in the RepeaterAuth Stream Manage message.

Elementary streams, identified by the *streamCtr* value which is used during HDCP Encryption of the elementary stream, are assigned the same Type value that is assigned to the corresponding Content Stream by the HDCP Transmitter. All elementary streams transmitted by the HDCP Transmitter to the HDCP Repeater, after HDCP Encryption, are assigned Type values.

<u>The streamCtr</u> assigned to an elementary stream is followed by its corresponding ContentStreamID value and its assigned Type value in the RepeaterAuth Stream Manage message.

Syntax	No. of Bytes	Identifier
RepeaterAuth_Stream_Manage{		
msg_id	<u>1</u>	<u>uint</u>
seq_num_M	<u>3</u>	<u>uint</u> uint
<u>for(j=0;j<k;j++) u="" {<=""></k;j++)></u>		
<u>streamCtr_i</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>uint</u>
ContentStreamID	<u>2</u>	<u>uint</u> <u>uint</u>
Type	<u>1</u>	<u>uint</u>
<u>}</u>		
1		
Table 4.18 <mark>. Repeater A</mark>	Auth_Stream_Manage Paylo	ad

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streamCtr assigned to an elementary stream is concatenated with its corresponding ContentStreamID value and its assigned Type value. All values are in big-endian order.

k is the number of elementary streams that are being transmitted by the HDCP Transmitter to the attached HDCP Repeater during the HDCP Session.

Parameter	No. of Bytes	Description
ContentStreamID	2	Content Stream Identification. This parameter must be
		assigned the PID value as follows.
		ContentStreamID[15:13] = 0
		ContentStreamID[12:0] = PID
Type	1	0x00 : Type 0 Content Streams. May be transmitted by
		the HDCP Repeater to all HDCP Devices.
		0x01 : Type 1 Content Streams. Must not be transmitted
		by the HDCP Repeater to HDCP 1.x-compliant
		Devices and HDCP 2.0-compliant Repeaters
		0x02 – 0xFF : Reserved

Table 4.19. RepeaterAuth_Stream_Manage Parameters

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4.2.16 RepeaterAuth_Stream_Ready (Receiver to Transm	litter)	•	Forma	atted: Bullets and Numbering
		T 1 (*6*		
RepeaterAuth_Stream_Ready{	No. of Bytes	<u>Identifier</u>		
msg_id	1	uint		
<u>M'[2550]</u>	32	uint		
$\frac{1}{1}$				
Table 4.20. <u>RepeaterAuth_Strea</u>	m_Ready Payloa	<u>d</u>		
4.2.17 Receiver AuthStatus (Receiver to Transmitter)		•	Forma	atted: Bullets and Numbering
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·				
LENGTH parameter is the size of the Receiver_AuthStatus compliant Receiver will set the LENGTH parameter equal to f				
the msg_id, LENGTH and REAUTH_REQ parameters. An Hi				
receives a Receiver_AuthStatus message with the LENGTH				
must read the msg_id, LENGTH and REAUTH_REQ paramet				
parameters.				
Curretory	No. of Bytes	Identifier		
Receiver_AuthStatus{	No. of bytes	Identifier		
msg_id	1	uint		
LENGTH	$\frac{1}{2}$	uint		
REAUTH_REQ	1	bool		
1				
Table 4.21. Receiver AuthSt	atus Payload			
4.2.18 AKE Transmitter Info (Transmitter to Receiver)		•	Forma	atted: Bullets and Numbering
LENGTH parameter is the size of the AKE Transmitter Info compliant Transmitter will set the LENGTH parameter equal to				
the msg_id, LENGTH, VERSION and TRANSMITTER_CAP				
HDCP 2.1-compliant Receiver that receives an AKE_Tra				
LENGTH parameter greater than six bytes must read the m				
TRANSMITTER_CAPABILITY_MASK parameters and must				
The HDCP Transmitter must set VERSION to 0x01.				
Syntax	No. of Bytes	Identifier		
AKE_Transmitter_Info{				
msg_id	<u>1</u>	<u>uint</u>		
LENGTH	<u>2</u>	<u>uint</u>		
<u>VERSION</u>	$ \begin{array}{c} \frac{1}{2} \\ \frac{1}{2} \end{array} $	<u>uint</u>		
TRANSMITTER_CAPABILITY_MASK	2	<u>uint</u>		
1 1				
Table 4.22. AKE Transmitte	r_Info Payload			
		_		the di Normal Laft Indanti Laft. Ci
			Forma First li	atted: Normal, Left, Indent: Left: 0", ne: 0"

Parameter

RECEIVER_CAPABILITY_MASK

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Parameter	<u>No. of</u>	Description	
	Bytes		
TRANSMITTER_CAPABILITY_MASK	<u>2</u>	Bits 15:1: Reserved zeros.	
		<u>Bit 0:</u>	
		TRANSMITTER_LOCALITY_PRECOMPUTE_SUPPORT.	
		When this bit is set to one, it indicates that the HDCP Transmitter	
		supports pre-computation of L during the locality check protocol.	
	Table 4	23. AKE Transmitter Info Payload	
			we attack Dullate and Numbering
4.2.19 AKE Receiver Info (Recei	ver to T	ransmitter)	ormatted: Bullets and Numbering
I ENGTH parameter is the size	ze of the	AKE_Receiver_Info message in bytes. An HDCP 2.1-	
compliant Receiver will set the	LENGTH	I parameter equal to six bytes i.e. the combined size of the	
<u>msg_id, LENGTH, VERSION</u>	and REC	CEIVER_CAPABILITY_MASK parameters. An HDCP	

RECEIVER_CAPABILITY_MASK parameters and must ignore the remaining parameters. The HDCP Receiver must set VERSION to 0x01.

$\frac{1}{2}$	<u>uint</u> <u>uint</u> <u>uint</u> uint
$\frac{1}{2}$	<u>uint</u>
2	
<u> </u>	uint
1	uint
$\overline{2}$	uint
_	
	$\frac{1}{2}$

No<u>. of</u>

Bytes

2

2.1-compliant transmitter that receives an AKE_Receiver_Info message with the LENGTH parameter greater than six bytes must read the msg_id, LENGTH, VERSION and

Table 4.24. AKE_Receiver_Info Payload

Bits 15:1: Reserved zeros.

Table 4.25. AKE_Transmitter_Info Payload

protocol.

Description

Bit 0: RECEIVER_LOCALITY_PRECOMPUTE_SUPPORT. When this bit is set to one, it indicates that the HDCP Receiver supports pre-computation of L' during the locality check _ -

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5 Renewability

It is contemplated that an authorized participant in the authentication protocol may become compromised so as to expose the RSA private keys it possesses for misuse by unauthorized parties. In consideration of this, each HDCP Receiver is issued a unique Receiver ID which is contained in *cert_{rx}*. Through a process defined in the HDCP Adopter's License, the Digital Content Protection LLC may determine that an HDCP Receiver's RSA private key, kpriv_{rx}, has been compromised. If so, it places the corresponding Receiver ID on a revocation list that the HDCP Transmitter checks during authentication.

The HDCP Transmitter is required to manage system renewability messages (SRMs) carrying the Receiver ID revocation list. The validity of an SRM is established by verifying the integrity of its signature with the Digital Content Protection LLC public key, which is specified by the Digital Content Protection LLC.


For interoperability with HDCP 1.x, KSVs of revoked HDCP 1.x devices will be included in the HDCP 2 SRM, in addition to the HDCP 1.x SRM. Similarly, Receiver IDs of revoked HDCP 2 devices will be included in the HDCP 1.x SRM, in addition to the HDCP 2 SRM.

The SRMs are delivered with content and must be checked when available. The Receiver IDs must immediately be checked against the SRM when a new version of the SRM is received. Additionally, devices compliant with HDCP 2.0 and higher must be capable of storing at least 5kB of the SRM in their non-volatile memory. The process by which a device compliant with HDCP 2.0 or higher updates the SRM stored in its non-volatile storage when presented with a newer SRM version is explained in Section 5.2.

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5.1 SRM Size and Scalability



DCP LLC Signature

DCP LLC Signature

Figure 5.1. SRM Generational Format

As illustrated in Figure 5.1, the size of the First-Generation HDCP SRM will be limited to a maximum of 5kB. The actual size of the First-Generation SRM is 5116 bytes. For scalability of the SRM, the SRM format supports next-generation extensions. By supporting generations of SRMs, an HDCP SRM can, if required in future, grow beyond the 5kB limit to accommodate more Receiver IDs. Next-generation extensions are appended to the current-generation SRM in order to ensure backward compatibility with devices that support only previous-generation SRMs.

Table 5.1 gives the format of the HDCP 2 SRM. All values are stored in big endian format.

Name	Size (bits)	Function
SRM ID	4	A value of 0x9 signifies that the message is for HDCP 2. All other

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	values are reserved. SRMs with values other than 0x9 must be ignored.			
4	A value of 0x1 signifies that the message is for HDCP2			
8	Reserved for future definition. Must be 0x00			
16	Sequentially increasing unique SRM numbers. Higher numbered SRMs are more recent			
8	Indicates the generation of the SRM. The generation number starts at 1 and increases sequentially			
24	Length in bytes and includes the combined size of this field (three bytes) and all following fields contained in the first-generation SRM i.e. size of this field, Number of Devices field, Reserved (22 bits) field, Device IDs field and Digital Content Protection LLC signature field (384 bytes) in the first-generation SRM			
10	Specifies the number (N1) of Receiver IDs / KSVs contained in the first-generation SRM			
22	Reserved for future definition. All bits set to 0			
40 * N1	40-bit Receiver IDs / KSVs			
Max size for this field is 37760 (4720 bytes)				
3072	A cryptographic signature calculated over all preceding fields of the SRM. RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 is the signature scheme used as defined by PKCS #1 V2.1: RSA Cryptography Standard. SHA-256 is the underlying hash function Table 5.1 System Renewability Message Format			
	8 16 8 24 24 10 22 40 * N1 Max size for this field is 37760 (4720 bytes)			

Table 5.1. System Renewability Message Format

Each subsequent next-generation extensions to the first-generation SRM will have the following fields.

Name	Size (bits)	Function
Length	16	Length in bytes and includes the combined size of this field (two bytes) and all following fields contained in this next-generation extension i.e. size of this field, Number of Devices field, Reserved (6 bits) field, Device IDs field and Digital Content Protection LLC signature field (384 bytes) in this next-generation SRM
Reserved	6	Reserved for future definition. All bits set to 0
Number of Devices	10	Specifies the number (N2) of Receiver IDs / KSVs contained in this next generation extension
Device IDs	40 * N2	40-bit Receiver IDs / KSVs
DCP LLC Signature	3072	A cryptographic signature calculated over all preceding fields of the SRM. RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 is the signature scheme used as defined by PKCS #1 V2.1: RSA Cryptography Standard. SHA-256 is the underlying hash function

Table 5.2. Next-generation extension format

5.2 Updating SRMs

The stored HDCP SRM must be updated when a newer version of the SRM is delivered with the content. The procedure for updating an SRM is as follows:

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- 1. Verify that the version number of the new SRM is greater than the version number of the SRM currently stored in the device's non-volatile storage
- 2. If the version number of the new SRM is greater (implying that it is a more recent version), verify the signature on the new SRM

On successful signature verification, replace the current SRM in the device's non-volatile storage with the new SRM. If, for instance, the device supports only second-generation SRMs and the new SRM is a third-generation SRM, the device is not required to store the third-generation extension. Devices compliant with HDCP 2.0 or higher must be capable of storing at least 5kB (actual size is 5116 bytes) of the SRM (First-Generation SRM).

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Appendix A. <u>Core Functions and Confidentiality and Integrity of Values</u>

Table A.1 identifies the requirements of confidentiality and integrity for values within the protocol. A *confidential* value must never be revealed. The *integrity* of many values in the system is protected by fail-safe mechanisms of the protocol. Values that are not protected in this manner require active measures beyond the protocol to ensure integrity. Such values are noted in the table as requiring integrity. <u>Core Functions must be implemented in Hardware. The values used by Core Functions, along with the corresponding Core Functions by which they are used, are identified in the table.</u>

Value	Confidentiality Required [±] ?	Integrity Required [±] ?	Value used by <u>Core</u> <u>Functions?</u>	Core Funct Formatted Table
lc ₁₂₈	Yes	Yes	Yes	HDCP Encryption and Decryption
kpub _{dcp}	No	Yes	No	N/A
<i>cert</i> _{rx}	No	No	No	N/A
kpub _{rx}	No	Yes	No	N/A
Receiver ID	No	Yes	No	N/A
kpriv _{rx}	Yes	Yes	Yes	Handling of Device Secret Key, during AKE, in plaintext form
r _{tx}	No	Yes*	Yes	
r _{iv}	No	Yes*	Yes	<u>N/A</u>
REPEATER	No	Yes	No	<u>N/A</u>
r _{rx}	No	Yes**	Yes	N/A
k _m	Yes	Yes*	Yes	Handling of Master Key, during AKE (including Pairing) and Key Derivation, in plaintext form
k _d	Yes	Yes*	No	<u>N/A</u>
<u>dkey₀ dkey₁</u>	Yes	Yes*	<u>No</u>	<u>N/A</u> Deleted: D
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[±] According to the robustness rules in the HDCP Adopter's License

* Only within the transmitter

* Only within the transmitter

** Only within the receiver

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		ent Adaptation	Specification	Intel and DCP LLC Confidential
Revision 2. <u>1</u> _				
<u>dkey</u> 2	Yes	Yes*	Yes	Handling of information or materials during Key Derivation and SKE, including but not limited to cryptographic keys used to encrypt or decrypt HDCP Core Keys (k_{o}), from which HDCP Core Keys could reasonably be derived
<u>ctr</u>	No	Yes*	Yes	N/A
Н	Yes	Yes	No	N/A
H'	No	No	No	N/A
m	No	No	Yes	<u>N/A</u>
k _h	Yes	Yes	Yes	Handling of information or materials during Pairing, including but not limited to cryptographic keys used to encrypt or decrypt HDCP Core Keys (k_m) , from which HDCP Core Keys could reasonably be derived
<i>r</i> _n	No	Yes*	Yes	N/A
L	Yes	Yes	No	<u>N/A</u>
L'	No	No	No	<u>N/A</u>
k _s	Yes	Yes*	Yes	Handling of Session Key, during SKE and HDCP Encryption/Decryption, in plaintext form
V	Yes	Yes	No	<u>N/A</u>
V'	No	No	No	<u>N/A</u>
Receiver ID list	No	Yes	No	<u>N/A</u>
DEPTH	No	Yes	No	<u>N/A</u>
DEVICE_COU NT	No	Yes	No	<u>N/A</u>
MAX_DEVS_E XCEEDED	No	Yes	No	<u>N/A</u>
MAX_CASCA DE_EXCEEDE D	No	Yes	No	<u>N/A</u>
inputCtr	No	Yes*	Yes	HDCP Encryption and Decryption

HDCP Interf Revision 2.1		lent Adaptation	Specification	Intel and DCP LLC Confidential Deleted: HDCI	P on 802.11 Specification
streamCtr	No	Yes*	<u>Yes</u>	HDCP Encryption and Decryption	
р	No	Yes*	Yes	HDCP Encryption and Decryption	
		Table A.1. <u>Core F</u>	onfidentiality and Integrity of Values		

HDCP Interface Independent Adaptation Specification Revision 2.1_______Intel and DCP LLC Confidential

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Appendix B. DCP LLC Public Key

Table B.1 gives the production DCP LLC public key.

Parameter	Value	(hexade	cimal)					
Modulus n	BOE9	AA45	F129	BAOA	1CBE	1757	28EB	2B4E
	8FD0	C06A	AD79	980F	8D43	8D47	04B8	2BF4
	1521	5619	0140	013B	D091	9062	9E89	C227
	8ECF	B6DB	CE3F	7210	5093	8C23	2983	7в80
	64A7	59E8	6167	4CBC	D858	B8F1	D4F8	2C37
	9816	260E	4EF9	4eee	24DE	CCD1	4B4B	C506
	7AFB	4965	E6C0	0083	481E	8E42	2A53	A0F5
	3729	2B5A	F973	C59A	A1B5	в574	7C06	DC7B
	7CDC	6C6E	826B	4988	D41B	25E0	EED1	79BD
	3985	FA4F	25EC	7019	23C1	B9A6	D97E	3eda
	48A9	58E3	1814	1E9F	307F	4CA8	AE53	2266
	2BBE	24CB	4766	FC83	CF5C	2D1E	3AAB	AB06
	BE05	AA1A	9B2D	в7Аб	54F3	632B	97BF	93BE
	Claf	2139	490C	E931	90CC	C2BB	3C02	C4E2
	BDBD	2F84	639B	D2DD	783E	90C6	C5AC	1677
	2E69	6C77	FDED	8A4D	6A8C	A3A9	256C	21FD
	B294	0C84	AA07	2926	46F7	9B3A	1987	E09F
	EB30	A8F5	64EB	07F1	E9DB	F9AF	2C8B	697E
	2E67	393F	F3A6	E5CD	DA24	9BA2	7872	F0A2
	27C3	E025	B4A1	046A	5980	27B5	DAB4	B453
	973B	2899	ACF4	9627	0F7F	300C	4AAF	CB9E
	D871	2824	3EBC	3515	BE13	EBAF	4301	BD61
	2454	349F	733E	в510	9FC9	FC80	E84D	E332
	968F	8810	2325	F3D3	3E6E	6DBB	DC29	66EB
Public Exponent o	03							
Exponent e							C Dubl	

Table B.1. DCP LLC Public Key

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HDCP Interface Independent Adapta Revision 2.1	ion Specification Intel and DCP LLC Confidential	- <u> </u>	eted: HDCP on 802.11 Specification
Appendix C. Bibliography	(Informative)		
These documents are not normatively reference information.	ed in this specification, but may provide useful supplementary		
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ITU-T Recommendation H.222.0 / ISO/IEC 12 video data	8818-1 (2006) Amendment 2 (Aug. 2007), Carriage of auxiliary		
SMPTE 2022-1-2007, Forward Error Correct 2007	ion for Real-Time Video/Audio Transport Over IP Networks, May		
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Feb./March 2005,	ing over IP Networks, SMPTE Motion Imaging Journal, PathHnteropVideoIP.pdf?CFID=16660544&CFTOKEN=dd0a39 2626C372C		
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Main HDCP Transmitter Function

The HDCP System places the following constraints on the number of HDCP Devices and levels of HDCP Repeaters in the topology.

- Up to four levels of HDCP Repeaters and as many as 32 total HDCP Devices, including HDCP Repeaters, are allowed to be connected to an HDCP-protected Interface port; and
- An instance of an Upstream Content Control Function transmits a content stream to the HDCP Transmitter. For every such content stream received and encrypted by the HDCP System, the HDCP Transmitter is allowed to transmit the generated HDCP Content stream to up to four levels of HDCP Repeaters and as many as 32 total HDCP Devices, including HDCP Repeaters.


The first constraint is met by implementing the authentication protocol independently on each HDCPprotected interface port and verifying that the DEPTH and DEVICE_COUNT read from the connected repeater are less than or equal to 4 and 31 respectively (HDCP Transmitter sub-function). To meet the second constraint, the HDCP Transmitter (that is not an HDCP Repeater) performs an additional step after all its HDCP-protected interface ports have reached the terminal states of the authentication protocol i.e. State H0 (unconnected), State H1 (inactive or unauthenticated) and State A5 (authenticated). This is the main HDCP Transmitter function. For each of its HDCP-protected interface ports connected to an HDCP Repeater that have reached the authenticated state, State A5 and that will transmit the content stream received from a specific instance of the Upstream Content Control Function, the HDCP Transmitter computes the total number of HDCP Devices connected to each HDCP-protected interface port by incrementing the received DEVICE_COUNT on those ports by one (to account for the connected HDCP Repeater).

Total_Port_Device_Count = DEVICE_COUNT + 1

It then computes the total number of HDCP Devices connected to the HDCP Transmitter as follows

Total_Transmitter_Device_Count = Total_Port_Device_Count_1 + \dots + Total_Port_Device_Count_n, where n is the total number of HDCP-protected interface ports on the transmitter.

If the computed Total_Transmitter_Device_Count exceeds 32, the top-level HDCP Transmitter disables encryption and aborts the HDCP Session on all its HDCP-protected interface ports. The state diagram (Figure 2.13) and the description below relates to the main HDCP Transmitter function.



Transition Any State:M0. The HDCP Transmitter transitions in to the Idle state when content protection is not desired by the upstream content control function. HDCP Encryption is disabled in this state.

Transition M0:M1. The transition occurs when content protection is desired by the upstream content control function and authentication has been initiated by the HDCP Transmitter on any of its HDCP-protected Interface ports by transmission of an AKE_Init message.

State M1: Wait for transmitter ports. In this state the transmitter waits for all its HDCP-protected interface ports to transition to the unconnected (State H0), inactive (State H1) or authenticated state (State A5).

Transition M1:M2. This transition occurs when all ports have transitioned to the unconnected, inactive or authenticated states.

State M2: Compute DEVICE_COUNT. The HDCP Transmitter computes the total number of HDCP Devices connected to it i.e. the Total_Transmitter_Device_Count.

Transition M2:M0. This transition occurs if the computed Total_Transmitter_Device_Count exceeds 32 or all transmitter ports have transitioned to unconnected or inactive state.

Transition M2:M3. This transition occurs if the computed Total_Transmitter_Device_Count for the HDCP Transmitter is less than or equal to 32.

State M3: Authenticated. At this time, and at no time prior, the HDCP Transmitter makes available to the Upstream Content Control Function upon request, information that indicates that the HDCP System is fully engaged and able to deliver HDCP Content, which means (a) HDCP Encryption is operational on each downstream HDCP-protected Interface Port connected to an HDCP Receiver, (b) processing of valid received SRMs, if any, has occurred, as defined in this Specification, and (c) there are no HDCP Receivers on HDCP-protected Interface Ports, or downstream, with *Receiver ID*s in the current revocation list.

Transition M3:M1. This transition occurs when re-authentication has been initiated by the HDCP Transmitter on any of its HDCP-protected Interface ports by transmission of an AKE_Init message.

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HDCP Repeater connect propagated by the repeater disconnected indication	Indication. When an authenticated HDCP Reation is disconnected, the resulting Receiver D ater to the upstream HDCP Transmitter whe must be propagated to the upstream HDCP T are no more authenticated HDCP Receivers con	isconnected Indication must not be en HDCP Content is flowing. The ransmitter once the flow of HDCP
Receiver is disconnected downstream port of the authentication requests for disconnected, the HDCP HDCP Transmitter. The	dication when HDCP Receiver is Re-connected and reconnected to the downstream porte e repeater detects the same Receiver ID, a from the upstream HDCP Transmitter during P Repeater need not propagate the Receiver Co HDCP Repeater may initiate authentication, c P Receiver and enable HDCP Encryption.	t of the HDCP Repeater i.e. the and there were no intervening re- the time the HDCP Receiver was connected Indication to the upstream




Figure 2.15. HDCP Receiver Reconnect

In Figure 2.15, Rx1 and Rx2 are authenticated HDCP Receivers connected to HDCP Repeater R1. When Rx2 is disconnected and reconnected and there were no intervening re-authentication requests from Tx1, R1 may authenticate Rx2 without propagating the Receiver Connected Indication to Tx1.